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We introduce search and matching unemployment into a model of trade with differentiated goods and 
heterogeneous firms. Countries may differ with respect to size, geographical location, and labor
market institutions. Contrary to the literature, our single-sector perspective pays special attention to
the role of income effects and shows that bad institutions in one country worsen labor market
outcomes not only in that country but also in its trading partners. This spill-over effect is conditioned
by trade costs and country size: smaller and/or more centrally located nations suffer less from 
inefficient policies at home and are more heavily affected from spill-overs abroad than larger and/or 
peripheral ones. We offer empirical evidence for a panel of 20 rich OECD countries. Carefully 
controlling for institutional features and for business cycle comovements between countries, we 
confirm our qualitative theoretical predictions. However, the magnitude of spill-over effects is larger in 
the data than in the theoretical model. We show that introducing real wage rigidity can remedy this 
problem.  
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1 Introduction
“In the flat world, one person’s economic liberation could be
another’s unemployment.” (Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat,
2005, p. 205)
“Globalization” is one of the key words in the current economic debate. It vaguely
refers to the fact that countries and their actions are no longer independent from each
other. Rather, the economic, political, and social performance of one country also depends
on the policies taken by other countries. The study of these interdependencies is the epit-
ome of international economics, whether countries are linked via trade in final goods or
inputs or through international mobility of capital or labor. These interdependencies
also seem to be at the core of widespread popular fears related to the globalization phe-
nomenon. Those worries are typically strongly related to labor market issues and feature
prominently in discussions of the current global economic crisis.
This paper offers a theoretical and empirical perspective on how changes in labor mar-
ket institutions in one country affect labor market outcomes in the countries with which
it trades. The theoretical framework combines the model of trade in differentiated goods
(Krugman, 1979, 1980; Melitz, 2003) with the canonical search and matching approach
(Pissarides, 2000). To capture interdependencies, countries may differ with respect to
labor endowments, geographical position, and labor market institutions. We account for
firms’ monopoly power on the goods markets by modeling strategic wage bargaining.
Besides these generalizations of the standard frameworks, we do not add any other struc-
tural elements, shortcuts or simplifications and focus on structural (long-run) equilibrium
unemployment.
This no-frills model of the trade-unemployment relation predicts that bad institutions
in one country worsen labor market outcomes not only in that country but also in those
that are related through trade in goods. This spill-over effect depends on trade costs and
country size: smaller and/or more centrally located nations suffer less from inefficient
policies at home and are more heavily affected from spill-overs abroad than larger and/or
peripheral ones. We confirm this spill-over effect of bad labor market institutions in
our econometric analysis. However, we also find that the spill-over effects present in
the data are substantially bigger than the ones predicted by our theoretical exercise.
To remedy this shortcoming, the model requires more real wage rigidity than the one
implied by wage-setting a` la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). We interpret this finding
as another indication that the standard matching model has difficulties reproducing the
variability of unemployment rates found in the data. Whereas Shimer (2004, 2005) refers
to unemployment fluctuations over time, we find a similar phenomenon across countries..
There is an emerging consensus in the macroeconomic labor literature that institutions
matter for structural unemployment; in particular, pervasive product market regulation
increases unemployment.1 One may therefore conjecture that trade barriers also foster
1 See for example Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991); Nickell (1997); Ljungquist and Sargent (1998);
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unemployment. Recent econometric evidence supports this view, see Dutt, Mitra, and
Ranjan (2009) or Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2009). Moreover, to the extent that
labor market institutions affect the volume and pattern of trade between countries, it is
likely that trade acts as a vehicle through which institutional features of one country also
affect labor market outcomes in the other.
Conceptually, one may distinguish between four potential channels through which
trade in goods leads to interdependence of countries’ labor market outcomes. The first and
best understood link is the effect of labor market institutions on the pattern of comparative
advantages. If labor market institutions in one country deteriorate, unemployment in that
country increases. This increases the relative capital-labor abundance of the country.
Hence, a relatively capital-rich economy will specialize more strongly on the capital-
intensive good while the trading partner produces more of the labor-intensive good. Labor
demand in the partner country goes up and the marginal value product of labor increases.
Firms find it optimal to create more vacancies, which leads to a fall of unemployment.
However, if the country with the deteriorating institutions is labor-rich, the opposite
logic applies and unemployment in the partner country will rise. Hence, the sign of the
correlation of unemployment rates between countries is ambiguous. It depends crucially
on the comparison of capital-labor ratios across countries.
The second channel is an income effect. If labor market institutions in one country
worsen, unemployment in that country goes up. This reduces the income of that country,
which leads to a decreasing demand for partner countries’ exports. The income channel,
thus, leads to a positive correlation of unemployment rates induced by labor market
changes between countries. Effects of this type operate in the new economic geography
literature2 but have hardly been explored in models of trade and unemployment. The
effect relies crucially on the use of a full-fledged general equilibrium model. One reason
why the literature has so far down-played this channel is that its existence gives rise to
complications that frustrate closed-form analytical solutions and require to simulate the
model.
A third potential link operates through a competitiveness effect. It is most visible
in partial equilibrium models of strategic interaction where income effects are typically
absent. Bad labor market institutions in one country drive up labor costs, thereby de-
creasing the degree of international competitiveness for all firms from that country. Hence,
consumers switch to foreign suppliers, reducing derived labor demand at home and in-
creasing it abroad. This channel tends to decrease unemployment in the trading partners
and therefore generates a negative correlation of unemployment rates across countries.
A fourth link, strongly related to the existence of firm selection, lies in the compo-
sition of active firms in the trading partners and is an indirect effect of the second and
the third links discussed above. The second channel (the income effect) reduces the ex-
port demand of the trading partners. This lowers the weight of exporting firms, which
Nickell and Layard (1999); Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Ebell and Haefke (2009) and Felbermayr and
Prat (2009).
2See for an overview Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) or Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano,
and Robert-Nicoud (2003).
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are the most productive ones, and thus reduces average productivity. The third channel
reduces the competitiveness of the country whose labor market institutions worsen. This
alleviates competitive pressures on domestic producers in the other countries, which im-
plies that firms with low productivity, that could not enter the market before, are now
profitable. This again reduces average productivity abroad and thus demand for labor,
thereby generating a positive correlation between unemployment rates.
Our paper features the last three channels; the well-understood comparative advan-
tage link being absent due to the one-sector structure of the model. We show that the
most straightforward combination of the Krugman/Melitz-framework with the search-
unemployment mechanism a` la Pissarides implies a positive conditional correlation of
unemployment rates across countries. Firm heterogeneity is not crucial for this result if
market size is important but it turns out to magnify the strength of the spill-overs and
is therefore quantitatively important. We document these findings in simulations of the
calibrated model and confirm their empirical validity in an econometric exercise.
Related literature. A large number of papers studies the effect of cross-country differ-
ences in labor market institutions on the pattern of trade, and subsequently, on welfare,
the factor income distribution, and unemployment. Early contributions built on frame-
works of comparative advantage, in particular on the two-country, two-factor, two-good
(2× 2× 2) Heckscher-Ohlin model. Brecher (1974) was the first to study minimum wages
in such a framework. Davis (1998) has generalized the Brecher model. In this framework,
minimum wages in a capital-abundant country can lead to higher wages in the labor-
abundant country and trade exacerbates the adverse effects of minimum wages. David-
son, Martin, and Matusz (1988, 1999) introduce search frictions and wage bargaining into
multi-sector models of international trade governed by comparative advantage.3 These
more general models yield very similar conclusions as the Davis (1998) setup. Hence,
within the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, predictions are robust to different wage setting
assumptions.
The recent literature focuses on firm-level increasing returns to scale and product
differentiation featured by the Krugman (1979, 1980) model and its generalization to
heterogeneous firms by Melitz (2003). Two labor market paradigms have been most
extensively used: fair wage preferences (and the closely related efficiency wage approach)
and the search and matching approach. A central limitation of Krugman-type models with
asymmetric trade costs consists in the absence of closed form solutions due to the fact
that labor market clearing conditions are transcendental. Hence, Egger and Kreickemeier
(2008, 2009), Eckel and Egger (2009) and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008) focus on
perfectly symmetric cases so that equilibrium outcomes can be completely characterized
analytically. This practice makes it impossible to address the effect of asymmetries in labor
market institutions and their cross-country implications, which lies at the heart of our
3More recently, Cun˜at and Melitz (2007) study the effect of cross-country differences in firing restric-
tions on patterns of comparative advantage in a Ricardian setting, but they do not address the issue
of unemployment. Cun˜at and Melitz (2007) contains an excellent discussion of papers that address the
effect of labor market institutions on trade patterns.
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analysis. Other authors have maintained analytical tractability by fixing expected wages
in a nume´raire sector that remains unaffected by labor market frictions and trade costs,
and which may additionally absorb all income effects due to quasilinear preferences.4 This
strategy blends the comparative advantage channel with Krugman/Melitz mechanisms.
Our paper does not follow this path: it allows for income effects to be fully operative
and focuses entirely on intra-sector reallocation (with intersectoral reallocation absent).
In order to see how our approach differs, it is useful to consider recent papers that use a
multi-sector structure.
Helpman and Itskhoki (2008) use a two-sector, two-country model, where one sector
produces varieties of differentiated goods under conditions of firm-level economies of scale,
monopolistic competition, iceberg trade costs and heterogeneous firms a` la Melitz (2003).
This sector also features search unemployment. The other (nume´raire) sector features a
linear production function, perfect competition, no trade costs, and no search frictions.
Families allocate members to sectors such that, in equilibrium, expected wage rates are
equalized. In most of the paper, Helpman and Itskhoki focus on a situation where con-
sumers’ preferences are quasi-linear in the nume´raire good. Countries are identical except
for labor market frictions, which are parameterized so that both economies are diversified.
In this setup, the less sclerotic country specializes on the differentiated good. Trade
liberalization triggers a reallocation of workers into the differentiated sector, thereby push-
ing up aggregate unemployment. However, there are additional effects due to increased
exit and entry of firms and changes in terms of trade, so that the net effect is ambiguous.
Helpman and Itskhoki show numerically that a reduction of search frictions in one country
leads to a hump-shaped response in this country’s unemployment rate but unambiguously
decreases the unemployment rate in the other country. It is unclear whether unemploy-
ment rates move in the same or in opposite directions; moreover, it is perfectly possible
that the more rigid country has the lower rate of unemployment.5 Helpman and Itskhoki
acknowledge that “the unemployment results depend on certain structural features of the
model” (p. 4).
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2008a,b) build on the paper by Helpman and It-
skhoki (2008), but assume that workers differ according to an exogenously given ability.
Firms engage into costly screening of their potential workers’ abilities before the wage
bargain. In that setup, a deterioration of home labor market institutions has an am-
biguous effect on home unemployment, with a slightly favorable prediction for a negative
relationship. Higher search costs lead to a decrease in labor market tightness which raises
unemployment, but also induces a decrease of the fraction of exporting firms, which lowers
unemployment. Concerning spill-overs, their model predicts that “... a rise in the foreign
country’s labor market frictions raises unemployment in the home country while a rise in
4To our knowledge, in all papers that integrate search unemployment into general equilibrium trade
models authors assume that the destruction rates of matches (or firms) along the steady state are exoge-
nous. Relaxing this assumptions is an important direction for future research. One way to do this is to
depart from the standard Melitz (2003) model and to allow firm-level productivity to vary over time.
5However, whenever the labor market rigidities are low and the differences in labor market institutions
are not large, a reduction in one country’s search frictions lowers unemployment in both.
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the home country’s labor market frictions raises unemployment in the foreign country ”.6
Since, the effect of institutions on home unemployment is ambiguous, a negative correla-
tion between the home and the foreign unemployment rate is possible (and likely). The
key to understand this result is to recognize that foreign labor market institutions affect
unemployment in the domestic market only through trade openness and the fraction of
firms that export. Lower variable trade costs and higher foreign labor market frictions
increase unemployment in the domestic country by raising the fraction of home firms that
export. The increase of firms that export in the domestic market leads to a shift of the
industry composition of low- to high-productivity firms. As more productive firms are
more selective, unemployment goes up.
Egger, Greenaway, and Seidel (2008) obtain a similar relationship between labor mar-
ket institutions and unemployment at home and abroad. They use a multi-country, new
economic geography model of trade with mobile capital, where unemployment exists due
to fair wage preferences of workers. They find that: “A marginal increase in the fair wage
parameter” increases “the unemployment rate of [the home] country while more employ-
ment is generated in all other countries. A marginal variation in the replacement rate has
similar effects.” (Proposition 1)
Hence, recent theoretical papers mostly suggest a negative relationship between the
effects of labor market institutions at home and abroad.7 In contrast, our theoretical
model predicts a positive correlation between bad labor market institutions at home and
unemployment abroad, which is strongly supported by our empirical analysis. Also in line
with our theoretical predictions, the data suggests an important role for country size and
geography to condition institutional spill-overs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical
model. Section 3 explores the interdependence of labor market outcomes and unemploy-
ment of our theoretical model. In section 4 we provide empirical evidence for the key
predictions of our model. The last section concludes. The paper focuses on unemploy-
ment. Results pertaining to wage effects are relegated to the appendix.
6Proposition 6, part (iii) in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2008b).
7Note that the model from Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2008) would suggest that the correlation
between bad labor market institutions at home and home unemployment would be negative, whereas
the correlation with foreign unemployment would be positive. The predictions form the model of Eg-
ger, Greenaway, and Seidel (2008) would exactly be the opposite: The correlation of bad labor market
institutions with home unemployment would be positive, whereas it would be negative with foreign un-
employment. The papers by Beissinger and Bu¨sse (2001, 2002) are the only contributions where the
correlation between domestic and foreign unemployment is unambiguously positive and driven by a gen-
eral equilibrium income effect. In contrast to these papers, we allow for entry and exit of heterogeneous
firms, do not assume a frictionless economy, and focus on the dependence between trade costs and labor
market spill-overs.
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2 Model Setup
Our world consists of N potentially asymmetric countries, indexed by subscript i, with
i = 1, ..., N . Countries have work forces denoted by Li and labor is the only factor of
production. Firms differ with respect to their productivity level ϕ as in Melitz (2003).
The labor market features search and matching frictions as in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). Our framework generalizes Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008) to asymmetries
regarding country size, geographical location, and labor market institutions.
2.1 Demand for intermediate inputs
Similar to Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008),
in each country firms produce a final output good Q under perfect competition. That
good is assembled from a continuum of intermediate inputs, indexed by ω, and supplied
by domestic and foreign firms who operate under conditions of monopolistic competition.
The final output good can be consumed or used by input producers. The aggregate
production function in country i is
Qi =
{
(M¯i)
ν−1
σ
∫
ω∈Ωi
q[ω]
σ−1
σ dω
} σ
σ−1
, (1)
where q[ω] denotes the quantity of intermediate input ω, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between any two varieties. The set of available intermediate inputs in country
i, Ωi, has measure M¯i. The parameter ν ∈ (0, 1) governs the extent of external economies
of scale:8 If ν = 0 the number of available varieties is irrelevant for total output. If
ν = 1 we obtain the case discussed by Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003). The price index
corresponding to (1) is given by:
Pi =
(
1
M¯1−νi
∫
ω∈Ωi
p[ω]1−σdω
) 1
1−σ
, (2)
where p[ω] is the price of a variety ω. We choose the price index of country one as the
nume´raire, i.e., P1 = 1.
Similar to Melitz (2003), intermediate input firms are uniquely described by different
productivity levels ϕ and place of origin, so that we can substitute the firm index ω with
ϕ and index prices and quantities with country subscripts denoting place of origin and
destination. Due to flow fixed costs, not all firms find it optimal to serve all markets.
Serving foreign customers in country j from country i entails iceberg trade costs τ ij ≥ 1
(with τ ii = 1 and τ ij = τ ji) for all i and j. Hence, an intermediate goods producer in
8See, e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) or Egger and Kreickemeier (2008b), where ν = 0; and
Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008) where v ∈ [0, 1].
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country i faces the following inverse demand schedule in country j:9
pij[ϕ] =
(
qij[ϕ]
τ ij
)− 1
σ
(Pj)
σ−1
σ
(
Yj
M¯1−νj
) 1
σ
. (3)
Profit maximizing firms allocate sales across markets such that marginal revenues are
equalized. This implies pij[ϕ] = τ ijpii[ϕ] for all markets j on which a firm ϕ based in
country i is active. Operating revenues of firms based in country i from sales to market
j are therefore equal to Rij[ϕ] = pij[ϕ]qij[ϕ]/τ ij. Total revenue of an intermediate input
producer based in country i with productivity ϕ, is then given by:
Ri[ϕ] =
N∑
j=1
Iij[ϕ]qij[ϕ]
σ−1
σ (Pj)
σ−1
σ
(
τ 1−σij Yj
M¯1−νj
) 1
σ
, (4)
where Iij[ϕ] is an indicator function that takes value one if a firm in country i with
productivity ϕ is active on market j and zero otherwise.
2.2 The Labor Market
Firms operate with linear production functions qij[ϕ] = ϕLij[ϕ], where Lij[ϕ] is the level
of employment at firm ϕ in country i for production of goods destined for country j.
Our model is in discrete time and all payments are made at the end of each period. At
the end of each period, firms and workers are hit by two different types of shocks: With
probability χ a job is destroyed due to a match-specific shock and with probability δ firms
are forced to leave the market. Assuming independence of these shocks, the actual rate
of job separation is given by η = δ + χ− δχ.
The flow costs of posting a single vacancy in country i are proportional to the pa-
rameter ci and measured in units of the final good. This implies that hiring costs are
linear in the number of workers to be recruited. As usual, the number of matches formed
in each period is given by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function. We denote by
mi[θi] = m¯i (θi)
−αi the share of posted vacancies v filled each period, where θi is the
vacancy-unemployment ratio in country i and m¯i measures the efficiency of the labor
market in country i, while αi is the elasticity of the matching function. The rate at which
unemployed workers find employment is θimi [θi] , an increasing function of θi.
Each period, an intermediate input producer ϕ in country i decides (i) about the
optimal number of vacancies to post vi [ϕ], anticipating the wage which will be bargained
with the workers, and (ii) how to allocate total production over the domestic and the N−1
foreign markets. Problem (ii) features a decision on the extensive margin (which markets
to serve, i.e., on Iij [ϕ]) and on the intensive margin (how much to sell on each market,
i.e., qij [ϕ]). We relegate the market entry problem to section 2.3. Here it suffices to note
that across every market where the firm is active, it will equalize marginal revenues, i.e.,
9Note that pij [.] is the cif price in market j and qij [.] is the quantity produced for that market,
including the iceberg transport costs.
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∂Rij [ϕ] /∂Lij [ϕ] = ∂Ri [ϕ] /∂Li [ϕ] for all j, where Li [ϕ] is firm ϕ’s total employment.
This rule determines the distribution of sales across markets given the total output of the
firm (which is, in turn, determined through the choice of νi).
Vacancy posting. The optimal value of an intermediate input producer is given by:
Ji [ϕ] = max
vi[ϕ]
1
1 + r
(
Ri[ϕ]− wi [ϕ]Li[ϕ]− Pivi [ϕ] ci
−Pi
N∑
j=1
Iij[ϕ]fij + (1− δ)J ′i [ϕ]
)
, (5)
s.t. (i) Ri[ϕ] given in equation (4),
(ii) L′i [ϕ] = (1− χ)Li [ϕ] +mi[θi]vi [ϕ] ,
where r denotes the interest rate, wi [ϕ] is the wage rate in country i paid by firm ϕ, J
′
i [ϕ]
is the value of an intermediate input producer next period, and L′i is firm ϕ
′s employment
in the next period. Constraint (i) is the revenue function and constraint (ii) gives the law
of motion of employment at the firm level. The first order condition for vacancy posting
can be stated as follows:
ciPi
mi[θi]
= (1− δ)∂J
′
i [ϕ]
∂L′i [ϕ]
. (6)
It shows that the firm equalizes marginal recruitment costs (given on the left hand side)
and the shadow value of labor (given on the right hand side). Note that firms with
different ϕ face identical expected recruitment costs; hence, the shadow value of labor is
the same across firms, too.
From the equalization of marginal revenues across markets, it follows that the shadow
value of labor does not depend on the market where the additional output is actually
sold. Hence, ∂Ji [ϕ] /∂Li [ϕ] = ∂Ji [ϕ] /∂Lij [ϕ] . Differentiating the objective function of
the firm (5) with respect to Lij yields:
∂Ji [ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
=
1
1 + r
(
∂Ri[ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
− wi [ϕ]− ∂wi [ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
Lij[ϕ] + (1− δ)(1− χ) ∂J
′
i [ϕ]
∂L′ij [ϕ]
)
. (7)
Employing the steady-state condition ∂Ji [ϕ] /∂Lij [ϕ] = ∂J
′
i [ϕ] /∂L
′
ij [ϕ] we obtain:
∂Ji [ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
=
1
r + η
(
∂Ri[ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
− wi [ϕ]− ∂wi [ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
Lij[ϕ]
)
. (8)
Using (6) and ∂Ji [ϕ] /∂Li [ϕ] = ∂Ji [ϕ] /∂Lij [ϕ] , we can solve for ∂Ri[ϕ]/∂Lij [ϕ] and
obtain an expression that implicitly determines the optimal pricing behavior of the inter-
mediate input producer:
∂Ri[ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
= wi [ϕ] +
∂wi [ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
Lij[ϕ] +
ciPi
mi[θi]
(
r + η
1− δ
)
. (9)
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Wage bargaining. The search-and-matching setup developed above is compatible with
a number of different assumptions concerning the wage-setting process. In the largest part
of this paper, we follow Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008). We assume that wages are
bargained before production takes place and that every worker is treated as the marginal
worker. This approach is fairly standard now in the literature (see Cosar et al. (2009);
Helpman and Itskhoki (2008)); it’s axiomatic foundation is laid out in Stole and Zwiebel
(1996). In a later section of this paper, we will argue that this formulation implies
too much wage flexibility so that foreign unemployment reacts too little to domestic
institutional changes compared to the empirical evidence. Hence, we also experiment
with the opposite extreme case of a perfectly rigid real wage as proposed by Shimer
(2004).
The total surplus from a successful match is split between the employee and the
intermediate input producer. The worker’s surplus is equal to the difference between the
value of being employed at firm ϕ, i.e., Ei [ϕ] = (wi [ϕ] + (1− η)Ei [ϕ] + ηUi) /(1 + r)
and the value of being unemployed Ui =
(
biΦi + θim[θi]E¯i + (1− θimi[θi])Ui
)
/(1 + r),
where θimi[θi] is an unemployed worker’s probability to find a new job and E¯i is the value
of employment at the average firm. The flow value of unemployment is given by biΦi
with bi ∈ [0, 1] and is proportional to the marginal value product of labor at the average
domestic firm deflated by the price index:10
Φi ≡ ϕ˜iipii [ϕ˜ii] /Pi. (10)
The variable Φi will turn out to be a sufficient statistic for determining the role of changing
productivity distributions on labor market outcomes. In the sequel (with some abuse of
wording) we refer to Φi as a measure of aggregate productivity.
Reformulating the expression for Ei[ϕ], the advantage of holding a job at firm ϕ over
searching one can be expressed as:
Ei [ϕ]− Ui = (wi [ϕ]− rUi) / (r + η) . (11)
The firms’s surplus is equal to the marginal increase in the firm’s value ∂Ji [ϕ] /∂Lij [ϕ],
which results from the assumption that every worker is treated as the marginal worker.
The outcome of the bargaining process over the division of the surplus follows the “surplus-
splitting” rule:
(1− βi) (Ei [ϕ]− Ui) = βi
∂Ji [ϕ]
∂Lij [ϕ]
, (12)
where the parameter βi measures the bargaining power of the workers and belongs to
(0, 1). From (6) and (12) it is already apparent that the value of employment Ei cannot
vary across firms so that heterogeneous firms will pay identical wages.
10The productivity of the average domestic firm is defined as ϕ˜ii and further explained in subsection
2.3. As in Melitz (2003), the upper-tier CES aggregate implies pii[ϕ]ϕ = pii[ϕ′]ϕ′ for all values of ϕ and
ϕ′. Hence, specifically for ϕ˜ii.
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Labor market equilibrium. We can use the shadow value of labor as given in equation
(8) and the expression for the advantage of holding a job over searching as given in
equation (11) in the bargaining solution (12) to obtain:
wi[ϕ] = βi
∂Ri[ϕ]
∂Lij[ϕ]
− βi
∂wi[ϕ]
∂Lij[ϕ]
Lij[ϕ] + (1− βi)rUi. (13)
Using qij[ϕ] = ϕLij[ϕ] in equation (4) and differentiating with respect to labor input
Lij[ϕ] (assuming that Iij[ϕ] > 0), leads to
∂Ri[ϕ]
∂Lij[ϕ]
=
σ − 1
σ
qij[ϕ]
− 1
σϕ (Pj)
σ−1
σ
(
τ 1−σij Yj
M¯1−νj
) 1
σ
, (14)
which allows to solve the wage differential equation (13):11
wi[ϕ] = βi
(
σ
σ − βi
)
∂Ri[ϕ]
∂Lij[ϕ]
+ (1− βi)rUi. (15)
Using equation (3) in equation (14) and noting that ∂Ri[ϕ]
∂Lij
=
(
σ−1
σ
)
ϕτ−1ij pij =
(
σ−1
σ
)
ϕpii,
where the last equality follows from equalization of marginal costs between markets, leads
to the job creation curve
JCi:
wi
Pi
=
σ − 1
σ − βi
Φi − ci
mi[θi]
r + η
1− δ . (16)
The job creation curve slopes downward in θ since a higher degree of labor market tightness
makes it more costly to fill vacancies so that a smaller share of the surplus Φ can accrue
to the worker. Hence, the real wage falls in θ. Importantly, the wage rate depends only
on aggregate variables such as Pi,Φi or θ and does, therefore, not vary across firms. The
intuition is that firms with high productivity are larger and move their marginal revenue
functions further down by exactly the amount that equalizes the value of a filled vacancy.
Combining equations (3), (9), and (15) shows that the wage rate is given by the sum
of the value of non-employment (rUi) and the rent that the worker can extract from the
firm:
wi [ϕ] = rUi +
βi
1− βi
r + η
1− δ
ciPi
mi[θ]
. (17)
Using the expression for Ui, we can write rUi = biΦi + θim[θi]
(
E¯i − Ui
)
. Using equation
(11) and noting that wi [ϕ]− rUi is equal for all firms (see equation (17)), one can derive
the following wage curve:
Wi:
wi
Pi
= biΦi +
βi
1− βi
ci
1− δ
(
r + η
mi[θi]
+ θi
)
. (18)
11The solution can be checked by reinserting
∂wi
∂Lij
= βi
(
σ
σ − βi
) ∂ (∂Ri[ϕ]∂Lij )
∂Lij
= βi
(
σ
σ − βi
)(
∂Ri[ϕ]
∂Lij
)(−1
σ
)(
1
Lij
)
into equation (13).
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The wage curve is an increasing function of θ since workers have more power to hold-up
the firm when the labor market is tight and the costs of a break-down of negotiations are
high for firms.
The equilibrium real wage wi/Pi and labor market tightness θi are found by interacting
the wage curve with the job creation curve. A central feature of both the wage and the job
creation curves is that their intercept in (wi/Pi, θi)−space is proportional to Φi. In the
wage curve, this simply reflects the fact that unemployment benefits are by assumption
a share of the marginal value product of labor. More interestingly, the job creation curve
depends on Φi because more productive firms spend a smaller fraction of their revenue
on flow fixed costs fij, which are denominated in units of the final output good, and a
larger fraction on labor. Hence, the reallocation of workers towards more productive firms
increases the demand for labor.
We can now state a first Lemma.
Lemma 1 [Labor market equilibrium]
(a) For given aggregate productivity Φi, there is a unique labor market equilibrium {wi/Pi, θi}
if σ−1
σ−βi > bi.
(b) Wages are constant over firms.
(c) A decrease of Φi lowers the real wage wi/Pi and the degree of labor market tightness
θi.
(d) For given Φi, variation in institutional parameters bi, ci or m¯i leads to qualitatively
equivalent results as regards the degree of labor market tightness θi.
The Lemma shows that labor market outcomes can be entirely characterized once
aggregate productivity Φi is known. That variable summarizes the stance of the en-
tire productivity distribution and the number of available varieties. Trade liberalization
can only affect labor markets through this variable. Also, institutional changes in other
countries will affect domestic labor markets through Φi.
Part (a) in Lemma 1 follows from the fact that the job-creation curve is strictly
downward sloping in θi, while the wage curve is upward-sloping. An equilibrium exists
only if the flow-value of non-employment bi is smaller than the share of the value of the
match that will accrue to the worker.
Part (b) implies that workers are paid similarly across firms with different productivity
levels. As in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) firms exploit their monopsony power until employees
are paid their outside option. This property of the model is a fairly general feature of
Krugman/Melitz-type models.12
Part (c) holds true under the condition established in part (a). Figure 1 illustrates
this effect. The intuition is that any change in Φi must have a smaller effect on the flow
value of non-employment (biΦi) than on the flow value of employment
σ−1
σ−βiΦi; otherwise,
no worker would be willing to seek employment. Hence, a reduction in Φi shifts the wage
12See, e.g., Eckel and Egger (2009) for an analysis of unionized labor markets framework without search
frictions, and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008) for the case of firm-level collective bargaining in
the presence of search frictions.
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curve (Wi) down by less than the job creation curve (JCi) . It follows that both the real
wage and the degree of labor market tightness fall.
Figure 1: The effect of a fall in Φi on labor market tightness.
Part (d) establishes that, whatever the equilibrium value of Φi turns out to be, changes
in the most relevant labor market institutions – the replacement rate bi, hiring costs ci,
and the efficiency of the matching process m¯i – have similar qualitative effects on labor
market tightness and, hence, on the rate of unemployment.13 We will see below that the
determination of Φi does not directly depend on labor market institutions bi, ci, or m¯i but
only on labor market outcomes such as the real wage or the rate of unemployment. It
follows that changes in bi, ci, or m¯i have all qualitatively similar effects on labor market
outcomes in all countries. In our comparative statics exercise, it is therefore sensible
to focus on bi as one important (and empirically relevant) representative institutional
variable.
2.3 Entry- and Export Decisions of Firms
In this section, we need to set up those conditions that pin down Φi for all countries. This
is done by combining two sets of equations: conditions that describe the selection of firms
into different markets (the domestic and foreign ones) according to their productivity
13We have ∂θi/∂bi < 0, ∂θi/∂ci < 0, and ∂θi/∂m¯i > 0.
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levels, and conditions that determine the number of firms that enter into existence each
period. These equations will, amongst other things, determine the productivity of the
average firm ϕ˜ii and the price level. However, unlike in the perfectly symmetric setup
of Melitz (2003), Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008) or Eckel and Egger (2009), we
need to know labor market outcomes to pin down these variables. However, conceptually,
the section is close to Melitz (2003), and will therefore be deliberately brief.
There is an infinite number of potential firms which can enter the market after paying a
fixed and sunk entry cost f e, measured in terms of the final consumption good. Only after
entering, they are able to draw their productivity ϕ from a known distribution with p.d.f.
g[ϕ] and c.d.f. G[ϕ]. The productivity stays the same as long as the firm exists. Only
firms which draw a ϕ favorable enough to make non-negative profits will start production
and engage into sales in one or several markets.
Entry into markets. A firm with productivity ϕ located in country i will engage
in market j if the expected discounted operating profits exceed costs. Hence, the firm
recruits workers with the aim to produce output for market j if and only if
Πij [ϕ] =
∞∑
t=1
(
1− δ
1 + r
)t
piij [ϕ]− Pici
mi [θi]
Lij [ϕ]− Pifij
=
1− δ
r + δ
piij [ϕ]− Pici
mi [θi]
Lij [ϕ]− Pifij ≥ 0. (19)
The first term in expression (19) is the discounted flow of operating profits that a firm
in country i with productivity ϕ obtains from sales in country j. Note that this term
accounts for the fact that the firm may be hit by an (exogenous) exit shock during their
first period of existence in which no profits are forthcoming yet as recruitment of workers
takes one period. The second term describes the costs of recruiting, which arise before
production can start.
The flow of profits from sales to market j is given by
piij [ϕ] = Rij[ϕ]−
(
wi + Pici
χ
mi[θi]
)
Lij[ϕ]− Pifij, (20)
which are revenues in country j of a firm based in country i with productivity ϕ, Rij[ϕ],
minus total costs of employing the necessary amount of workers Lij to achieve those
revenues including the costs to replace the workers who quit (at exogenous rate χ) and
the fixed costs (in units of the final good) to maintain the presence in market j. Note that
we assume that the domestic final output good is used for foreign market fixed costs.14
We may characterize the productivity level which makes a firm indifferent between
operating in a market or not by solving Πij
[
ϕ∗ij
]
= 0. This gives the zero cutoff-profit
14One could alternatively posit that the foreign final output good is used for foreign fixed costs. Another
option would be to assume free trade in the final output good so that Pi = 1 in all countries. This choice
has no major qualitative implications for our findings.
13
condition
1− δ
r + δ
piij
[
ϕ∗ij
]
=
Pici
mi [θi]
Lij
[
ϕ∗ij
]
+ Pifij. (21)
For the marginal firm ϕ∗ij the discounted value of future operating profits has to be
large enough to cover the upfront costs of ramping up production (the hiring costs).
Empirical evidence strongly supports the view that only the most productive firms select
into foreign markets.15 Hence, we focus on parameter values where ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
ii for all
i, j. The ex ante probability of successful entry into the home market i is (1−G[ϕ∗ii]),
whereas the ex ante probability of exporting to country j conditional on successful entry
is %ij = (1 − G
[
ϕ∗ij
]
)/(1 − G [ϕ∗ii]). Note that %ij can also be understood as the share of
active firms that sell both to the domestic and to the foreign market j. Appendix A1
shows how ϕ∗ii and ϕ
∗
ij are related.
Entry into existence. Following Melitz (2003), we define the average productivity of
a domestic firm serving the domestic market i and any of the foreign markets j as:
ϕ˜ij =
(
1
1−G[ϕ∗ij]
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ij
(ϕi)
σ−1 g[ϕi]dϕi
)1/(σ−1)
. (22)
Based on this definition we can write down the free entry condition as:
f ePi =
N∑
j=1
(
1−G[ϕ∗ij]
)(1− δ
r + δ
piij[ϕ˜ij]−
Pici
mi[θi]
Lij[ϕ˜ij]− Pifij
)
, (23)
where we have the costs of entering a market on the left hand side and the expected
profits on the right hand side. The profits of the firm are not yet known at the time of
the entry-decision because the productivity level is unknown. With probability 1−G[ϕ∗ii]
the productivity will be high enough to make production profitable in the home country
i. With probability 1−G[ϕ∗ij] the productivity will be high enough so that even exporting
to country j is profitable. The term in brackets indicates how much a firm will earn in
these cases.
Equality in equation (23) is assured by the entry of new firms. As long as average
profits exceed the entry cost, new firms will enter the market, increasing competition,
thereby driving down profits until they have reached the entry cost (and vice versa if profits
are too low). The mass of available varieties in country i is given by M¯i =
∑
h %hiMh,
where Mh is the mass of active producers in country h.
2.4 Stationarity conditions
Employment dynamics. As usual, we focus on a situation where flows into unem-
ployment and out of it are of equal size, hence η (1− ui) = θimi [θi]ui. This provides
15For empirical evidence on selection into the export markets, see Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999,
2004); Roberts and Tybout (1997); and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998).
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us with a one-to-one mapping between labor market tightness and the stationary rate of
unemployment
ui =
η
η + θim[θi]
. (24)
Firm dynamics. Similarly, we require that the flow into the pool of operating firms is
equal to the flow out of this pool; hence, (1− δ) (1−G [ϕ∗ii])M ei = δM¯i, where M ei is the
total mass of firms that attempt entry (and therefore pay the entry fee f e).
2.5 Market clearing conditions
Labor market. The labor market clearing condition is given by Lei = (1−ui)Li, where
Lei is aggregate employment and Li is labor supply in country i. The mass of active
domestic firms adjusts so that the labor market clears, hence
Mi =
Lei∑N
j=1 %ijLij
[
ϕ˜ij
] . (25)
The market for the final output good. Total spending on the aggregate output
good, i.e., total nominal income, is defined as the sum of revenues generated by inter-
mediate goods producing firms from sales on the domestic and export markets. Using
the free entry condition given in equation (23), the expression for piij[ϕ] given in equa-
tion (20), the definition for the ex ante probability of exporting to country j conditional
on successful entry %ij = (1 − G
[
ϕ∗ij
]
)/(1 − G [ϕ∗ii]), the distribution of workers across
markets Lei = Mi
∑N
j=1 %ijLij
[
ϕ˜ij
]
, and summing over all firms Mi, we may solve for∑N
j=1Mi%ijRij[ϕ]:
N∑
j=1
Mi%ijRij[ϕ˜] = wiL
e
i +
PiMi
1− δ
(1 + r)∑
j
%ijfij +
r + δ
1−G [ϕ˜∗ii]
f e
+ η + r
1− δL
e
i
Pici
mi [θi]
,
(26)
which is the sum of payments to employed workers (aggregate consumption expenditure),
on flow fixed costs fij, on appropriately discounted up-front investments f
e, and on search
costs. Note that
∑N
j=1 %ijRij[ϕ˜] is equal to aggregate income in country i, denoted by Yi,
and also is equal to the value of final goods production.16
Input markets. Intermediate inputs are traded across countries. In equilibrium every
country maintains multilateral (though not bilateral) trade balance so that the total
16Note that we assume that the final output good is non-traded. Alternatively, one could assume that
Y is freely tradable across countries. This choice would neither be more realistic, nor would it give rise
to major analytical simplifications. Additionally, the results are hardly affected by assuming a freely
tradable final good.
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aggregate value of imports is equal to the total aggregate value of exports. The multilateral
trade balance constraint for country i (or, balance of payments, BOPi) is given by:
BOPi =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
P σ−1i τ
1−σ
ji
(
ϕ˜jj
ϕ˜ji
pj
)1−σ (
Yi
M¯i
)1−ν
%jiMj (27)
−
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
P σ−1j τ
1−σ
ij
(
ϕ˜ii
ϕ˜ij
pi
)1−σ (
Yj
M¯j
)1−ν
%ijMi = 0.
2.6 General equilibrium
To obtain analytical results, the literature usually assumes quasi-linear preferences or the
existence of a freely-traded nume´raire good which is produced in every country under
conditions of perfect competition and where there are no labor market frictions. We are
not opting for such a short-cut, since this would relegate the effect of changes in market
sizes into the nume´raire sector. Another way towards a full-fledged analytical solution of
the model is to assume perfect symmetry in all respects which yields a recursive model
structure. Under these latter circumstances, the present model perfectly coincides with
Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008) where the effects of trade liberalization on labor
market outcomes can be fully described analytically in closed-form and for a general
distribution function G(ϕ).
When countries are asymmetric, the Φ’s depend, amongst other things, on all the
countries’ disposable incomes. The disposable incomes are in part determined by the
respective rates of unemployment, hence Φi = f (u1, u2, . . . , uN , . . .) . The wage and job
creation curves imply that ui = g (bi, ci, m¯i; Φi) . Through Φi, country’ i
′s rate of unem-
ployment depends on all the other countries’ unemployment rates as well. This implies a
structural dependence of ui on the whole world’s collection of institutional labor market
variables.
The proposed model is a generalized version of Krugman (1980). That model does not
lend itself to analytical solutions in the presence of asymmetries and trade costs, even in
the absence of firm heterogeneity or search frictions.17 Note that the underlying problem
in this type of model does not stem from the existence of external economies of scale; it
also does not vanish when the price of the final output good Pi is equalized by frictionless
international trade. Hence, in order to assess the properties of the model, we need to
resort to calibration and simulation.18
17See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for a recent example. Technically, in the generalized Krugman
(1980) model, labor market clearing conditions give rise to transcendental equations which do not possess
any analytical solution. Hence, wages cannot be solved for analytically.
18This is what many authors in the economic geography literature do; see, e.g., the surveys by Fujita,
Krugman, and Venables (1999) or Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud (2003).
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3 Interdependence of labor market outcomes
3.1 Model calibration
We calibrate the model for three countries (hence, i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3 and N = 3),
which is the minimum number of countries in order to discuss the role of geography. We
choose parameter values such that all three countries are completely symmetric in the
initial steady-state and their equilibrium allocations replicate key empirical moments of
the United States for which both the search-and-matching and the Melitz (2003) model
have been calibrated by several authors. We set ν = 0 in our benchmark analysis (thereby
ruling out external economies of scale). Existence and uniqueness of this symmetric case
is shown in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008). Time is discrete and the time interval
is set to one month.
Productivity distribution. Following the literature,19 we assume that firms sample
their productivity from a Pareto distribution, so that the p.d.f. is g (ϕ) = γϕ¯γϕ−(1+γ).
The shape parameter γ measures the rate of decay of the sampling distribution and ϕ¯ > 0
is the minimum possible value of ϕ. We follow Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) and
set γ equal to 3.4. Without loss of generality, we may normalize ϕ¯ = 0.5.
Matching function. The matching function is Cobb-Douglas m¯ (θi)
−αi . We follow the
standard practice and set αi = 0.5. In the absence of well-established estimates, we set
the bargaining power βi = αi.
20 To calibrate the scale parameter m¯, we use empirical
estimates of the job finding rate and labor market tightness. Constant returns to scale of
the matching function implies that the equilibrium tightness must be equal to the ratio of
these two rates. Shimer (2005) estimates the monthly rate at which workers find a job to
be equal to 0.45. Hall (2005) finds an average ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers
of 0.539 over the period going from 2000 to 2002. Accordingly, we match an equilibrium
tightness of 0.5 by setting the monthly job filling rate to 0.9. Reinserting these values
into the matching function, we find that m¯ = 0.636.
Separation shocks. Job separations occur either because the firm leaves the market
or because the match itself is destroyed. We consider that the first type of shock arrives
at a Poisson rate of 0.916% per month. This implies that the annual gross rate of firm
turnover is equal to 22%21, as suggested by the estimates in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and
Scarpetta (2004). The match-specific shocks account for the job separations which are left
19See for example Axtell (2001); Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004); or Bernard, Redding, and Schott
(2007). The assumption of Pareto distributed productivities is justified by the observation that the log-
density of firms’s log-sizes is well approximated by an affine function.
20The equality of the bargaining power and matching function elasticity is known as the “Hosios
condition” (Hosios, 1990) in the search-matching literature. Note, however, that in our case this condition
is not sufficient to ensure an efficient allocation because of the over-hiring externality.
21Along the steady state, the gross rate is 2× 12× 0.916 = 21.98.
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unexplained by the firm-specific shock. Given that Shimer (2005) estimates the monthly
rate of job separation to be 0.034, it follows that the rate of arrival of match-specific
shocks χ should be equal to 0.025 per month.
Cost parameters. We set the interest rate to 4% per year. In order to calibrate the
value of non-market activity, we follow Shimer (2005) and set bi = 0.4 for all i in the
benchmark to match an earnings replacement ratio close to 40%. The cost of posting a
vacancy, ci, is set 50% above the vacancy filing rate for all three countries. Given that
the equilibrium wage is around wi = 1.137, this value yields an average recruitment cost
of around 5.7 weeks of workers’ earnings, as suggested by empirical estimates.
Variable and fixed costs of trade and entry. We choose variable trade costs τ ij
equal to 1.3 for all country-pairs ij in the benchmark equilibrium, following Ghironi and
Melitz (2005). Given the Pareto distribution for firm productivities, the share of firms
that export is
%ij = τ
−γ
ij
(
Pj
Pi
)γ (Rjfii
Rifij
) γ
1−σ
. (28)
That number is put at about 21% by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003). To-
gether with τ ij = 1.3 for all country-pairs ij and assuming a symmetric benchmark equi-
librium, this pins down the ratio fij/fii at about 1.7. We use the values of entry costs,
f e, and the flow fixed costs, fij, to match the following two moments. First, we ensure
that the equilibrium tightness θi = 0.5 for all countries in the benchmark equilibrium.
Second, we target an average firm size equal to 21.8 employees, as estimated by Axtell
(2001). The calibrated entry costs are equivalent to 2.82 years of income per capita. This
figure can be compared to the assessment by Ebell and Haefke (2009) that regulatory
barriers to entry in the US amount to 0.6 month of yearly income. The parametrization
therefore suggests that technological innovation costs outweigh entry fees by an order of
magnitude. The Appendix contains a summary table of all chosen parameter values.
3.2 How domestic institutions impact outcomes world-wide
We now deviate from the symmetric benchmark equilibrium and allow for differences in
unemployment benefits, trade frictions, and country sizes. We pay particular attention
to cross-country differences in unemployment benefits as they are easily observable in
the data, exhibit substantial variation across countries, and are shown to consistently
explain unemployment rates in empirical research.22 Moreover, we know that the model
reacts similarly to changes in search costs ci or the search technology m¯i (see Lemma
1). Specifically, we study what effects an increase in unemployment benefits of country
1 (the “bad” country) has on unemployment in that country and, more importantly, in
its trading partners (countries 2 and 3). We vary b1 in the interval [0.4, 0.8] and hold
unemployment benefits for countries 2 and 3 constant at the benchmark value of 0.4.
22See, e.g., Bassanini and Duval, 2006.
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Similarly, we consider trade costs in [1, 1.6] , i.e., ad valorem tariff equivalents from 0 to
60%. Remember that the benchmark value of τ is 1.3 for all country-pairs ij (or: 30%).
For our first investigation we assume Li = L, hence countries are symmetric with respect
to all things except the unemployment benefits. The main insights from these experiments
are summarized in Results 1a to 1c and visualized in Figure 2. The left-hand diagram in
Figure 2 shows the unemployment rate in country 1 for various values of trade costs on
the x-axis (equal between all countries) and unemployment benefits in country 1 on the
y-axis. Trade costs are in percent, i.e., τ(%) = (τ − 1) × 100. The right-hand diagram
shows the unemployment rate in country 2 for various values of trade costs on the x-axis
and unemployment benefits in country 1 on the y-axis (country three is not shown, as the
effects there are equal to the ones in country two).
Result 1a [Globalization and labor markets]
Trade liberalization leads to lower unemployment in all countries.
Result 1a extends the theoretical findings in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008)
to asymmetric countries. As shown in Figure 2, in all countries, unemployment is lowest
for minimum values of trade costs and unemployment benefits of country 1. If trade costs
decrease from 60% to 0%, unemployment in all countries falls from about 8% to 6.5%.
So, trade liberalization can have a very substantial impact on the long-run structural rate
of unemployment.
The intuition for Result 1a is as follows. Trade liberalization affects the equilibrium
productivity distribution through the selection effect introduced in Melitz (2003): on the
one hand, inefficient firms in all countries suffer from increased import competition by
more efficient foreign firms, their residual demands and revenue levels fall, and they are no
longer able to cover operating fixed costs; on the other hand, the most efficient domestic
firms can expand due to increased foreign sales. Hence, there is a cleansing effect of trade,
and the average domestic firm ϕ˜ii is now more efficient than before trade liberalization. It
has larger sales and a lower price, pii [ϕ˜ii] , but – due to the standard assumption σ > 1,
the price falls by less than productivity increases. It follows that ϕ˜iipii [ϕ˜ii], the flow
value of an additional filled vacancy, increases due to trade liberalization. On top of this,
the aggregate price level goes down as prices of available varieties are on average lower.
Hence, the term Φi ≡ ϕ˜iipii [ϕ˜ii] goes up in all countries. To sum up, trade liberalization
strengthens the average firm’s incentives to post vacancies in all countries, leading to
lower unemployment in all countries.
This result is in line with aggregate empirical evidence presented by Dutt, Mitra, and
Ranjan (2009), or Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2009). However, it is in contrast to
a number of other theoretical contributions, such as Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) or
an array of recent contributions by Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding. The first authors
focus on a different labor market paradigm – fair wages. Trade liberalization would lead to
trade dispersion, which is deemed unfair and needs to be compensated by a higher average
wage level. This mechanism drives up the unemployment rate. The latter papers use the
search-matching model as we do. However, in addition they make various other structural
assumptions that condition the effect of trade liberalization on unemployment. Helpman
and Itskhoki (2008), and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2008a, 2008b), assume the
existence of a nume´raire sector with costless international trade, perfect competition,
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Figure 2: Country 1 labor market regulation and unemployment in countries 1 and 2
(=3). [Rate of unemployment on the vertical axis.]
constant returns to scale, and, most importantly, frictionless labor markets. The second
sector has heterogeneous firms, monopolistic competition, search frictions, and trade costs.
When trade costs fall, the second sector becomes more competitive, and workers leave
the no-unemployment nume´raire sector to fuel the expansion of the other sector. This
tends to result in higher aggregate unemployment. This result crucially depends on the
existence of the nume´raire sector. There is a second important difference relative to our
model: In most of their analysis, Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding assume that preferences
are quasilinear such that all changes in income are absorbed by the homogeneous good.
This means that additional income due to gains from trade does not create additional
demand in the unemployment-ridden second sector and can, therefore, not compensate
the increase in unemployment.
Result 1b [Labor market reform]
If one country increases its unemployment benefits, then unemployment increases in that
country.
An increase of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8 (at the benchmark value of τ = 30%) drives up the rate
of unemployment from about 7% to about 20%. This result is in line with closed economy
search-and-matching models and with empirical evidence.23 We will study in detail below
how the geographical location of the country with the deteriorating institutions conditions
the unemployment effect. Figure 2, however, already clearly suggests that the gradient of
u1 with respect to b1 is smaller if country 1 is more open to international trade.
Result 1c [Institutional spill-overs]
If one country increases its unemployment benefits, then, in all other countries, unem-
ployment rises. While this qualitative pattern is very robust, the size of the spill-over
23See Bassanini and Duval (2006).
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effect is about two orders of magnitude smaller than the own effect.
Result 1c is our central result about the interaction of labor market institutions. If
labor market institutions in country 1 deteriorate, unemployment in that country goes up,
real wages increase, but income falls (due to lower production). These effects also reduce
firms’ incentives to create jobs in countries 2 and 3. There are three channels through
which a change in b1 has an impact on Φ2 and Φ3 and therefore on unemployment: An
income effect, a competitiveness effect and a selection effect.
The income effect results from the reduced income in country 1. Country 1 spends
part of its income on foreign varieties. Hence, increased unemployment in that coun-
try reduces demand for goods from countries 2 and 3, thereby lowering those countries’
exports and export prices, which tends to increase unemployment. The second effect is
a competitiveness effect. As the increase in the workers’ outside option pushes up the
real wage in country 1, the prices of country 1’s varieties go up relative to varieties from
countries 2 or 3. Moreover, as employment contracts, the number of firms in country 1
and hence the number of varieties produced falls. This endows firms in countries 2 and 3
with a better competitive stance: Residual demand for each firm is higher, which tends to
decrease unemployment in countries 2 and 3. The income and the competitiveness effect
give rise to an additional effect that relies on the selection of firms. The reduced demand
for exports of firms from countries 2 and 3 (the income effect) harms the most productive
firms, as those are the only ones that export. As those firms lose weight, average produc-
tivity goes down and thus Φ2 and Φ3 fall. Similarly, decreased competitiveness of firms in
country 1 implies that domestic firms in countries 2 and 3 earn higher profits. It follows
that the entry-threshold falls: Some firms that were too unproductive to survive before
the reform, can now stay in the market and drive down average productivity. This again
drives down Φ2 and Φ3 and thus lowers incentives to post vacancies.
Overall, we have three channels through which a worsening of labor market institu-
tions in one country affects unemployment in its trading partners. The competitiveness
effect tends to decrease unemployment, while the income and the selection effects tend
to increase it. It turns out that the latter are dominating. This finding is very robust
to alternative calibrations. However, spill-over effects are fairly small quantitatively. The
own effect of inefficient labor market institutions in country 1 is by about two magnitudes
stronger than the effect on the unemployment rates in countries 2 and 3. This finding is
independent from varying other labor market parameters such as ci or m¯i. We will show
in section 3.6 that the magnitude of spill-overs is much higher when real wages are rigid.
3.3 How geography and country size shape the spill-over
The only channel of transmission of institutional changes in country 1 to labor market
outcomes in countries 2 and 3 is trade in intermediary goods. Since our model implies a
straight-forward gravity-type link between trade costs, country sizes, and bilateral trade
volumes, it is natural to study the implications of these variables on the strength of
institutional spill-overs.
Starting with the role of geography, we change the centrality of the “bad” country,
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country 1 (i.e., we vary its multilateral, or overall, degree of openness). Assuming symmet-
ric bilateral trade costs between all countries (τ jk = τ kj for all j, k) and treating countries
2 and 3 as identical (τ j1 = τ 1j = τ 1 for all j 6= 1), we solve the model for different degrees
of centrality of country 1 (i.e., we vary τ 1) while keeping trade costs between countries
2 and 3 (τ jk for all j 6= 1, k 6= 1) constant. The outcome is summarized in the following
result and visualized in Figure 3.
Result 2a [Geography and spill-overs]
As the degree of centrality of country 1 goes up, a given rise in country 1’s unemployment
benefits yields a smaller unemployment increase in country 1 and a larger increase in
countries 2 and 3.
For illustration see the variation of τ 1 on the x−axis in Figure 3. The variation of
country size on the y−axis is discussed in Result 2b. The figure shows the absolute
change of the unemployment rates, ∆u1 (left-hand diagram) and ∆u2 = ∆u3 (right-hand
diagram) generated by a given change of b1 (from 0.4 to 0.8; hence ∆b1 = 0.4) for different
values of τ 1, where lower values of τ 1 indicate higher centrality of country 1. For τ 1 = 30%
and si = 0.33, an increase of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8 moves u1 up by about 15 percentage points
in country 1 and by about 0.03 percentage points in countries 2 and 3. This effect can
also be read off Figure 2 by comparing unemployment rates at τ = 30% for b1 = 0.4 and
b1 = 0.8.
In line with Results 1b and 1c, the change in unemployment is positive for all coun-
tries. The new insight from Figure 3 is that a higher degree of centrality of the “bad”
country (i.e., a lower τ 1) weakens the increase in the unemployment rate in country 1 but
strengthens the increase in countries 2 and 3. We see that the increase in b1 increases
unemployment in country 1 by about 13 percent when τ 1 = 0 and by about 16 percentage
points when τ 1 = 0.6. Hence, the more central a country is, the lower are the unemploy-
ment costs of its own bad institutions. Trade partners, however, suffer more as a decrease
in τ 1 drives up the change in the unemployment rate. However, quantitatively, the effect
is fairly small.
The intuition for Result 2a is straightforward. If country 1 is more central, it trades
more with countries 2 and 3. If country 1 has no access to international markets (τ 1 →∞),
lower domestic demand for country 1’s products due to higher unemployment in that
country would be tantamount to lower total demand, so that the adverse labor market
implications are most severe. In the other extreme where τ 1 = 0, domestic demand
only accounts for a fraction of total demand faced by country 1’s firms. Since foreign
institutions remain unchanged, there is no first-order effect on foreign unemployment and
hence income, so that the relative downfall of total demand faced by country 1’s firms is
less than proportional to the fall in domestic demand. Therefore, the resulting increase
in the unemployment rate is smaller. That logic holds in reverse for countries 2 and 3
which rely more on country 1’s demand when τ 1 is lower.
Next, we study how the size of the “bad” country affects spill-overs. We measure
country size in terms of population, as income is endogenous in our model. More precisely,
we fix the world population Lw =
∑3
i=1 Li, and then change country 1’s share of world
population from 10% to 90%. The remaining population is distributed equally between
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Figure 3: Change in unemployment [on the vertical axis] as a function of centrality and
size of the “bad” country 1 for a given change of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8.
countries 2 and 3.
Result 2b [Relative size and spill-overs]
The higher the relative size of country 1 the stronger is the increase in unemployment
rates in all countries due to a rise of country 1’s unemployment benefits.
Figure 3 shows that, at the benchmark value of τ = 30%, moving s1 from 0.1 to 0.9
increases the gradient of unemployment with respect to b1 from about 12 percentage points
to 16 in country 1 and from virtually zero to about 0.14 percentage points in countries
2 and 3. The logic for this result is similar to the one about centrality. When s1 is very
large, demand of firms in all countries depends mostly on country 1’s income. Hence,
variations in b1 have strong implications not only for country 1 but for the entire world.
If s1 is very small, the variation in b1 has implications only for a very small fraction of
global demand and therefore has little effect on unemployment rates world-wide.
Firm heterogeneity and the existence of fixed costs for foreign production have im-
portant implications for the quantitative impact of institutional changes in the directly
affected country 1 and in its trading partners. The reason is that a shortfall of income
in country 1 has first-order effects on firms of all productivities in country 1. However,
in countries 2 and 3, only firms with high productivity levels directly depend on country
1’s level of income as less inefficient firms do not engage in international trade and are
therefore sheltered from variation in country 1’s labor market institutions. This explains
why the quantitative impact of ∆b1 is much stronger in country 1 than in the rest of the
world.
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3.4 The role of the elasticity of substitution and external economies
of scale
This section performs robustness checks with respect to the elasticity of substitution σ
between varieties of inputs and with respect to the degree of external economies of scale ν.
This exercise confirms the overall validity of Results 1 and 2 discussed above and further
allows insights into the details of the model mechanisms.
First, we focus on an increase in the elasticity of substitution σ. This parameter has
crucial implications for the role of the competitiveness and income effects discussed in
Result 1c.
The implications of changing σ are illustrated in Figure 4 which makes similar assump-
tions as Figure 3. Instead of relative country size, the y-axis now varies the elasticity of
substitution between 3.8 and 10, and the x-axis varies values of trade costs (equal between
all countries) as in Figure 2.24 The following result summarizes.
Result 3 [The elasticity of substitution and spill-overs]
The higher the elasticity of substitution, the smaller is the increase in unemployment rates
in all countries following a rise of country 1’s unemployment benefits.
A higher σ more strongly insulates firms from foreign competition as exports are
proportional to τ 1−σ.25 For given levels of trade costs, this term becomes smaller with
increases in σ and thus bilateral trade flows become lower. As a consequence, countries
depend less on global demand and more on domestic demand. This has two implications.
On the one hand, the country where the labor market shock occurs is hit harder as it
can not spill-over part of the negative shock to other countries, on the other hand trading
partners are less affected due to lower trade volumes. Hence, in country 1, the income
effect is stronger with higher σ, while it is weaker in the rest of the world.
Note further that, when ν < 1, the monopolistic competition model exhibits a monopoly
distortion that leads to excess entry. The strength of this distortion, however, depends
on σ (big if σ is small). So, as we increase σ, we reduce the distortion, which has positive
effects on the level of aggregate productivity and hence labor market outcomes. This ex-
plains why the increase in unemployment is smaller in country 1 for higher σ’s. Overall,
the smaller changes in unemployment of country 1 as well as the lower trade volumes for
higher values of σ imply that adverse spill-overs from country 1 to the rest of the world
should decrease with rising σ. In a world with increased product differentiation (σ falls),
cross-country interdependencies become more pronounced.
Up to now we have analyzed our model for the case of ν = 0, which implies that
absolute size effects do not influence the level of unemployment. Hence, whenever we
would increase the population in all countries, the rate of unemployment would not change.
However, new trade theory (see for example, Helpman and Krugman, 1985) and the new
economic geography (see for example, Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999; or Baldwin,
24 Note that σ is bounded from below by the condition σ−1σ−βi > bi for given bi and βi.
25This can be seen from rearranging equation (3).
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Figure 4: Change in unemployment [on the vertical axis] as a function of trade costs and
the elasticity of substitution for a given change of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8.
Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud, 2003) emphasize the role of market size
for explaining the pattern of trade as well as the agglomeration of industries and activities.
Hence, we next investigate how changes in the degree of external economies of scale, ν,
affect the spill-over. Result 4 summarizes our findings:
Result 4 [External economies of scale and spill-overs]
Stronger external economies of scale result in more pronounced unemployment effects in
all countries.
Figure 5 reveals that a higher ν implies a larger change in unemployment in all coun-
tries. The reason is that now the income effect is reinforced because the absolute size of
the countries matters while this effect is sterilized with ν = 0. A larger market implies
higher demand, leading to more production and, therefore, lower unemployment.
However, if unemployment benefits rise, the demand shrinks due to lower income
(resulting from less efficient institutions). A higher degree of external economies of scale
reinforces this process, leading in the end to higher unemployment in the country where
the unemployment benefits rise. The spill-overs for the trading partner are also larger
with a higher degree of external economies of scale due to the shrinking export market.
3.5 How important is firm-level heterogeneity?
Next, we explore the role of firm heterogeneity by changing γ, the shape parameter of
the Pareto distribution. We vary γ between 3.8 and 10. A shape parameter of the Pareto
distribution of γ = 3.8 with a lower bound of γ¯ = 0.5 implies a variance of 0.067, a
standard deviation of 0.260 and a coefficient of variation of 0.382, whereas a γ = 10
implies a variance of 0.004 a standard deviation of 0.062 and a coefficient of variation
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Figure 5: Change in unemployment [on the vertical axis] as a function of trade costs and
external economies of scale for a given change of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8.
of 0.112.26 Hence, a higher value of γ is associated with less firm heterogeneity; it is,
however, also associated with a lower mean of the productivity distribution. Our main
findings can be summarized as follows:
Result 5 [How firm heterogeneity conditions spill-overs]
The larger the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution describing the distribution of
firm-level productivity, the smaller is the effect on unemployment in all countries triggered
by a given increase in unemployment benefits in country 1.
The more equal firms are concerning their productivity, the less changes in unemploy-
ment benefits affect unemployment in both, the country where the change occurs and the
trading partner country. The effect of unemployment changes shrinks with more equal
firms, as changes in unemployment benefits have only a minor effect on average produc-
tivity. Hence, the competitiveness channel due to lower import competition is weakened,
leading to a smaller reaction of unemployment. For the trading partner, a second fact is
important. If firms are nearly homogeneous, then only few firms are productive enough to
incur the fixed costs for both, the home market and the foreign market. Hence, there is less
trade when firms are more homogeneous. With a γ = 10 and trade costs of τ = 1.6, the
spill-over nearly vanishes, as hardly any firm from country 1 serves the foreign customers.
Note that a value of γ = 10 does not completely shut down heterogeneity. If one
wants to eliminate heterogeneity, the zero-profit cutoff conditions become redundant and
the system of equilibrium conditions essentially collapses to one where the Krugman
26Note that for a Pareto distribution, the variance is given by γ¯
2γ
(γ−2)(γ−1)2 for γ > 2, the standard
deviation is given by γ¯γ−1
√
γ
γ−2 , and the coefficient of variance is given by
1√
γ(γ−2) . Further we assume
that γ > σ − 1 so that the variance of log productivity is finite.
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Figure 6: Change in unemployment [on the vertical axis] as a function of trade costs and
the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution for a given change of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8.
(1980) model is combined with search-and-matching unemployment. In the last step of
our numerical analysis, we therefore work with homogeneous firms. We assume that all
firms export, implying that the free entry condition given in equation (23) holds for all
firms.27 Without selection, there are many more firms left that export, as every firm that
enters the market also serves the customers abroad. We find the following result.
Result 6a [Spill-overs in the Krugman economy]
If firms are homogeneous and external economies of scale are important (ν = 1), then an
increase of unemployment benefits in country 1 leads to increases of unemployment in all
countries.
Figure 7 shows the effects of changes of unemployment benefits in country 1 on un-
employment for countries 1 and 2 when firms are homogeneous and ν = 1. We see that
the changes in unemployment are positive for both countries. The mechanism underlying
the spill-over is the change in the market size which results form higher unemployment
in country 1. Hence, the Krugman model highlights the market potential effect in the
absence of firm selection.
It is interesting to contrast this result with those obtained when firm heterogeneity
persisted but was assumed to gradually vanish. There, firms become more equal as γ
becomes larger. The spill-over there becomes smaller with higher γ as only few firms are
productive enough to export. If we focus on the Krugman economy, every firm that enters
the market also exports. In other words, the home and foreign market in the Krugman
model are not separated, rather firms maximize joint profits over these two markets.28
27In this setup, either all firms export or no firm does so. If no firm exports, there are no spill-overs at
all.
28Or one may argue that firms indeed maximize profits for the home and foreign market separately,
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Figure 7: Country 1 labor market regulation and unemployment in countries 1 and 2
(=3), when ν = 1 and firms are homogeneous. This corresponds to a Krugman (1980)
economy. [Rate of unemployment on the vertical axis.]
Hence, as it is always profitable for some firms to enter the market, spill-overs do not
vanish. Rather, there is another effect at work, namely, the market potential effect.
One may ask the question, what would happen in a world with homogeneous firms, if
the market potential effect where not at work? This case is summarized in Result 6b:
Result 6b [Spill-overs in the Krugman economy without external economies
of scale]
If firms are homogeneous and there are no external economies of scale (ν = 0), an increase
in unemployment benefits in one country will increase unemployment in that country while
unemployment in all other countries is (almost) unaffected.
As you can see in Figure 8, if we shut down the external economies of scale channel
when firms are homogeneous, no spill-overs are left on the unemployment rate in country
2 when τ = 1, and the effects are very small if τ > 1. If τ = 1, all varieties in the world
enter the price index and utility symmetrically. As absolute size differences do not matter
with ν = 0 and the competitiveness effect is not at work if firms are homogeneous, changes
in unemployment benefits in country 1 do not affect the unemployment rate in country 2.
However, if τ > 1, one channel is still at work, namely changes in the relative composition
of the consumption bundle. With changing unemployment benefits in country 1, the price
for varieties abroad changes. Hence, when varieties do not enter perfectly symmetric, as
is the case with τ > 1, there will be a compositional change in the consumption bundle.
Varieties produced at home become relatively cheaper, hence, consumers will switch from
foreign varieties to home varieties, which will lead to more production at home and less
but due to the homogeneity of firms, either all firms export or no firm does. There is no co-existence of
exporting firms and domestic firms as in the case with heterogeneous firms.
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unemployment. Hence, one part of the competitiveness channel survives, even in the
homogeneous firms model without external economies of scale.
3.6 The role of real wage rigidity
So far, our numerical exercise suggests that the effect of domestic institutional change on
the domestic rate of unemployment is by about two orders of magnitudes larger than the
effect on the foreign rate of unemployment. The calibration exercise is extremely stylized
and allows countries to differ only across a small set of parameters. Yet, the quantitative
findings are very robust to different parameterizations of the model. The small magnitued
of spill-over effects clearly questions their political relevance. Moreover, in section 4, we
will measure the magnitude of spill-over effects in an empirical panel analysis of 20 rich
OECD countries. The regressions suggest a larger and more important role for spill-over
effects.
To address these concerns, this subsection shows that the lack of strong spill-over ef-
fects in our theoretical benchmark model is related to the Shimer-puzzle (Shimer, 2005),
which posits that the conventional search-and-matching model of the (closed) US econ-
omy cannot reproduce the elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to produc-
tivity shocks along the business cycle. Our model concentrates on spatial dependence
across countries rather than on time-series evidence. However, the problem is similar.
The change in country 1’s labor market institutions affects the other countries’ rate of
unemployment through aggregate productivity in those countries. If the link between
productivity and unemployment is generally weak, then spill-overs have to be small.
Therefore, we follow Shimer (2004) and contrast the analysis of earlier subsections,
29
Country 1, ∆ Unemployment Country 2, ∆ Unemployment
0
15
30
45
60
10
30
50
70
90
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
τ1 (%)s1=L1/L
w
0
15
30
45
60
10
30
50
70
90
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
τ1 (%)s1=L1/L
w
Figure 9: Change in unemployment [on the vertical axis] as a function of centrality and
size of the “bad” country 1 for a given increase of country 1’s search costs from 1 to 1.3
under perfect real wage rigidity.
where wages are bargained individually, with the opposite extreme assumption of perfect
real wages rigidity. The lack of adjustment in prices naturally increases the scope of
adjustment in quantities. Hence, real wage rigidity should increase spill-overs in terms
of unemployment rates. Comparing the cases of individual bargaining with rigid wages
spans the interval in which the ‘true’ size of spill-overs lies.
When real wages are rigid, the wage curve (18) is replaced by the requirement that
wi/Pi = ω¯i. We recalibrate the model such that our choice ω¯i reproduces the unemploy-
ment rates, firm and job turnover rates, export penetration rates, and the average firms
sizes as shown in Table A1. All external parameters are the same as in the earlier cali-
bration.29 Since the replacement rate bi appears only in the now redundant wage curve,
we vary the cost of vacancy creation ci over the interval [1, 1.3].
Figure 9 reproduces Figure 3 for the new scenario (c1 rather than b1 is changed) and
under the assumption of rigid real wages. When c1 grows from 1 to 1.3, the unemployment
rate in country 1 moves up by about 0.8 to 2.2 percentage points, depending, as before,
on the relative size of country 1 and on its geographical location relative to its trading
partners. The spill-overs to countries 2 and 3 (again treated symmetric) are now much
more sizeable than before and vary between 0 and 1 percentage points. The model predicts
that the strength of spill-overs is up to 45% of the effect in the reforming country. This is
in strong contrast to our earlier results for flexible wages (Figure 3). To make sure that
this difference does not come from our change in the experiment (changing c1 instead of
b1), we repeat the same exercise with flexible wages. Figure 10 confirms that the change
29The structure of the model implies that, in the baseline equilibrium, the value of ω¯i will be identical
to the real wage that results under individual bargaining.
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when wages are perfectly flexible.
in results indeed stems from wage rigidity.
Result 7 summarizes these findings.
Result 7 [The role of real wage rigidity]
The size of international spill-over effects depends on the degree of wage rigidity. When
wages are perfectly flexible, an increase in country 1’s search costs has small effects on
country 2 and 3’s unemployment rates. When real wages are perfectly rigid, the same
scenario leads to an increase in unemployment in countries 2 and 3 of up to 45% of the
effect in country 1.
4 Empirical evidence
In this section, we use panel data on labor market institutions and unemployment rates
for 20 rich OECD countries for 1982-2003. Our aim is not to provide a formal test of
our theoretical model, but rather to check whether the empirical evidence is in line with
three key predictions of our model, namely: (i) controlling for business cycle comovement,
unemployment rates are positively correlated across countries; (ii) the unemployment rate
of a country is not only determined by its own labor market institutions but also by those
of other countries; (iii) the relative importance of foreign countries’ institutional features
depends crucially on openness and relative size; (iv) the size of the spill-over effects
depends on the degree of real wage rigidity.
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4.1 Econometric specification
Our starting point is a standard cross-country unemployment regression. Bassanini and
Duval (2006) provide a comprehensive survey of different empirical models and methods.30
Typically, researchers have estimated equations of the type
uit = λ · LMRit + pi · pmrit + γ · gapit + Fi +Tt + Sit + εit, (29)
where LMRit is a vector of variables describing the stance of labor market regulations
such as union density, the degree of corporatism, employment protection legislation (EPL),
and a measure that relates to the flow value of non-employment bit. It also includes a
measure of the intensity of product market regulations, pmrit, and the output gap, gapit
(calculated as the difference between actual output and the HP-filtered series). The
vector Fi collects the comprehensive set of country fixed-effects, and Tt is a vector of year
dummies while Sit includes a number of variables recording exogenous shocks (TFP, real
interest rates, terms of trade, and labor demand shocks). The construction of the latter
variables is detailed in Bassanini and Duval (2006) and is in line with common practice
in the literature. The error term εit is assumed to have the usual properties.
Bassanini and Duval (2006) do not survey a single study which would address the
possibility that the foreign rate of unemployment or foreign labor market regulations
might matter for domestic labor market outcomes.31 The existing literature has found
robust and quantitatively relevant effects on the rate of unemployment only for a very
limited number of labor market institutions. The most important is the participation tax
rate, or tax wedge (see Costain and Reiter, 2008). It consists of the sum of the average
wage tax burden and social benefits foregone when a worker switches from unemployment
into a job. It therefore measures the total fiscal burden imposed on the worker (Saez,
2002; Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2007). This will be our preferred measure
of bit. Other measures relating to the nature of wage bargaining, employment protection
legislation, or the prevalence of minimum wages receive mixed empirical support. This
is not necessarily surprising, given the ambiguity of theoretical results (see, e.g., the
discussion in Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 ).32 Hence, in our regressions, we mostly focus
on a single labor market variable, the tax wedge (bit), but we also include additional
controls as robustness checks. A number of variables in (29) may seem endogenous; the
existing literature, however, almost always treats them as exogenous and we largely follow
this tradition as we lack natural instruments.33
30The condensed and revised version is published as Bassanini and Duval (2009).
31A recent empirical literature studies the effects of trade openness on unemployment rates; see Dutt,
Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) and Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2009). These papers find that trade
liberalization lowers structural unemployment rates in the long run.
32Another variable that typically works well but that is very crude and not directly related to our
theoretical model is the degree of corporatism. Typically, highly corporatist countries such as Scandina-
vian countries or Austria have lower unemployment rates due to centralized bargaining and the implied
internalization of economy-wide effects of wage negotiations by the unions.
33Costain and Reiter (2008) argue that using the tax wedge rather than unemployment benefits mit-
igates endogeneity concerns. Also not that our extensive business cycle controls account for cyclical
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Our theoretical model gives rise to a gravity-type relation between bilateral trade
volumes and explanatory variables related to countries’ market sizes and bilateral trade
costs.34 The model also predicts that the effect of labor market regulations of some
country j on country i′s rate of unemployment is conditioned by the amount of bilateral
trade between the two countries. However, when computing trade-weighted averages of
foreign variables to gauge the influence, e.g., of foreign labor market institutions, we need
to make sure that the weights are strictly exogenous. Hence, we proxy the amount of
bilateral trade between i and j by
ω˜ijt =
POP α1it POP
α2
jt
DIST δij
, (30)
where POPit denotes population of country i, DISTij is the great circle distance between
the two countries’ most populated cities; α1, α2, and δ are parameters. ω˜ijt varies with
time as population changes. It mimics the simplest possible gravity formulation, but
substitutes population for GDP which is potentially endogenous.35 Standard gravity
predictions suggest that α1 = α2 = 1. Overman, Redding, and Venables (2003) state that
δ, “the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to distance is usually estimated to be in
the interval 0.9 to 1.5.” In a meta analysis of 1,467 estimates from 103 papers, Disdier and
Head (2008) find that the mean effect is about 0.9, with 90% of estimates lying between
0.28 and 1.55. Hence, we choose δ = 1 as our benchmark case, but conduct robustness
checks with respect to the assumptions on α1, α2, and δ.
We calculate ω˜ijt for all 168 countries for which population and distance data is avail-
able (i.e., not only the 20 OECD countries for which we have reliable labor market data).
There are several possible ways to normalize the data; the choice of normalization has in-
terpretational consequences but should not affect our qualitative findings. In our preferred
setting, we normalize the weights such that
∑168
j=1 ωijt = 1 for all 168 countries. Then, we
construct the trade-weighted average of foreign unemployment rates, u∗it =
∑20
j=1 ωijtujt,
where country i′s rate of unemployment is excluded by definition (ωiit = 0) and the sum-
mation only involves the 20 OECD countries for which high-quality unemployment rates
are available. Similarly, we construct the trade-weighted average tax wedge of all countries
other than i as b∗it =
∑20
j=1 ωijtbjt (and similarly for all other labor market variables LMRit,
denoted by LMR∗it), and the average foreign output gap as gap
∗
it =
∑20
j=1 ωijtgapjt. Note
that this strategy implies that the foreign variables have smaller sample means than the
domestic ones.
covariation between uit and bit. In a similar empirical study without spill-over effects, Felbermayr, Prat,
and Schmerer (2009) treat bit as endogenous but do not find evidence for endogeneity bias.
34See Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) for a derivation of a gravity model in the presence of
firm heterogeneity.
35We have also worked with predicted bilateral trade volumes obtained by regressing observed bilateral
trade on exogenous variables such as population, distance, and other typical covariates such as common
language, contiguity, joint membership of countries in currency unions or free trade areas, etc., using
Poisson Pseudo maximum likelihood methods following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008). Results
are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable. We prefer our specification as bilateral trade volumes
may be endogenous to unemployment rates so that weights obtained from this procedure may lead to
inconsistent estimates.
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A natural alternative normalization would set the weights such that
∑
k∈K ωikt = 1,
where K is the set of our 20 OECD countries. One could also normalize weights by
maxj ωijt. In a series of robustness checks, we will show that the choice of normalization
has little qualitative effect on our results.
4.2 Data
Bassanini and Duval (2006) have assembled the most comprehensive data set on labor
market variables. It reflects intensive efforts at the OECD to come up with harmonized
measures. Unfortunately, it covers only 20 countries36 for the years 1982 to 2003. How-
ever, it should be mentioned that virtually all cross-country unemployment regressions
in the literature make use of exactly this data set (or its numerous precursors), see for
example Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005). The key problem with unemployment rates
from a wider spectrum of countries is their lack of comparability across time and space.
Moreover, detailed data on labor market institutions does not exist, except for a cross-
section (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, De Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004). Data on the degree
of product market regulation (PMR), the output gap, and the array of exogenous shocks
also come from Bassanini and Duval (2006).
Data on geographical distance come from CEPII.37 Population data is from the Penn
World Tables mark 6.2. We compute capital stocks using the perpetual inventory method;
see Benhabib and Spiegel (2005). Summary statistics are in the Appendix.
4.3 Conditional cross-country correlation of unemployment rates
As a first step, we show that our data replicates the typical results found in the empirical
literature. Column (1) in Table 1 shows the results of estimating (29) using OLS. The
coefficient on the tax wedge bit, our key labor market variable of interest, implies that a
20 percentage point increase (approximately equal to one standard deviation of b in the
data) increases the equilibrium rate of unemployment by about 1.8 percentage points.
Union density and employment protection legislation (EPL) do not have any measurable
influence on equilibrium unemployment. This is a standard finding; see Bassanini and
Duval (2006) or Baker, Glyn, Howell, and Schmitt (2004). Countries featuring a high
degree of corporatism (such as the Scandinavian countries or Austria) have a rate of
unemployment that is by about 1.7 percentage point lower. Finally, the output gap (gap)
is an important determinant of the unemployment rate. Note that country fixed effects
alone explain about 78 percent of the total variation (adjusted R2) of unemployment
rates in our sample (not shown). Accounting for the common business cycle by including
year fixed effects adds five percentage points of explanatory power; adding country-specific
36Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Switzerland (CHE), Germany
(DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Great Britain (GBR), Ireland
(IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Portugal
(PRT), Sweden (SWE), and the United States of America (USA).
37www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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estimates of the output gap adds another five so that these three variables already generate
an adjusted R2 of 0.88. The additional covariates used in (1) of Table 1 increase the
adjusted R2 to 93 percent. Hence, controlling for business cycle effects and fixed country
characteristics, labor market institution do not explain a large fraction of variance of the
unemployment rate since their entire cross-sectional variance is absorbed by the country
fixed effects.
In the next step, we include the trade-weighted average foreign unemployment rate
u∗it and estimate versions of
uit = ρu
∗
it + λ · LMRit + pi · pmrit + γ1 · gapit + γ2 · gap∗it + Fi +Tt + Sit + εit. (31)
The domestic unemployment rate is not used in the calculation of u∗it. However, if shocks
to the unemployment rate exhibit correlation between countries, then estimation of (31)
via OLS would yield a biased value for ρ. To avoid this endogeneity bias, we instrument u∗it
by lagged foreign regulatory variables, LMR∗i,t−1, pmr
∗
i,t−1.
38 The underlying assumption
is that past foreign regulation is exogenous to domestic contemporaneous labor market
outcomes.
Columns (2) and (3) show the most parsimonious specifications, using only u∗it along
with gapit,Fi,Tt, and Sit. The OLS estimate and the IV estimate are both positive; the
former is ρOLS = 0.072; the latter, being somewhat smaller, is ρIV = 0.067. The sign of the
bias ρOLS−ρIV is not surprising, since one would have expected that unemployment shocks
are correlated positively between countries so that OLS should overestimate. However,
the difference between the estimates is very small and will remain so in more complete
specifications. Note that adding u∗it increases the adjusted R
2 relative to a model with
gapit,Fi,Tt, and Sit as the only controls from 88 to 92 percent. Also note that the IV
strategy works well: invalidity of instruments or model specification is rejected with high
degrees of statistical significance.
Columns (4) and (5) add an array of labor market controls. They also include gap∗it
in order to control for the direct effect of the foreign business cycle on domestic unem-
ployment. Qualitatively and quantitatively, results are comparable to those presented
in column (1). However, the measured coefficient ρ is somewhat larger now than in the
specification without controls. The sign of the endogeneity bias of ρ changes, but the dif-
ference between the OLS and the IV estimate is minor. Interestingly, while the coefficient
on gap∗it is estimated with low precision, its sign is positive.
Columns (6) and (7) drop the insignificant labor market controls. Results do not
change much, but the overidentification test (while easily passed) becomes less convincing.
Hence, we prefer specification (5) over (7). It implies that an increase of the average
foreign unemployment rate by one percentage point increases the domestic unemployment
rate by about 0.09 percentage points. The average effect, therefore seems small. In
terms of the (different) underlying standard deviations of uit and u
∗
it, the effect is 0.06
(0.088*3.144/4.294). However, this average effect may hide substantial variation across
countries.
38This vector of instruments satisfies tests for instrument validity.
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Columns (8) to (11) include the ratio of capital intensities (K∗/L∗) / (K/L) = k∗/k
and the interaction term u∗×k∗/k.39 This is motivated by the prediction of the Heckscher-
Ohlin-framework, where the spill-over depends on the relative capital-to-labor ratios form
the home country k and the foreign country k∗. More precisely, suppose that a bad shock
on foreign institutions drives up foreign unemployment. If the foreign economy is relatively
capital-abundant relative to the domestic economy, after the shock its effective capital to
labor ratio is even higher than before and it produces more of the capital-intensive good.
The domestic economy, in turn, produces more of the labor-intensive good so that labor
demand goes up, and ultimately unemployment falls. This is, however, not what we
observe in the data, where an increase in u∗ drives up domestic unemployment by more
when the domestic economy appears relatively capital poor. However, the effect is weak,
and inference is possibly problematic since k and hence k∗/k may be endogenous. Also,
results rely on a fairly small country sample. While not offering a conclusive test, our
results at least suggest that empirical support for the comparative advantage view is
probably weak. Given the well-known poor empirical performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, this is not a surprise. Also note that Dutt, Mitra and Ranjan (2009) have not
found any effect of comparative advantage motives in the determination of unemployment
rates in a large cross-section of countries. The standard deviation of k∗/k relative to its
mean (the coefficient of variation) is 1.91, while that of u is 0.54. Hence, our results do
not hinge on the absence of variance in k∗/k in our sample.
Interestingly, the direct effect of k∗/k on the equilibrium unemployment rate is negative
and statistically significant. However, that effect is hard to interpret. The overall extent
of comparative advantage of the domestic economy could be measured by |1− k∗/k| or
(1− k∗/k)2 . Both variables have no clear empirical effect on the unemployment rate.
4.4 Domestic unemployment and foreign institutions
In the next step, we analyze the direct effect of foreign labor market institutions on the
domestic rate of unemployment. We estimate an equation of the form:
uit = λ · LMRit+λ∗·LMR∗i,t+pi ·pmrit+γ1 ·gapit+γ2 ·gap∗it+Fi+Tt+ Sit+εit, (32)
where LMR∗it collects foreign labor market variables.
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the most parsimonious specification, where we include
only the domestic and the foreign tax wedges (bit, b
∗
it) as well as the controls for the
domestic and the foreign business cycles and the complete set of fixed effects. We find
that the own and the foreign tax wedges help explain the domestic unemployment rate.
Both have coefficients with the signs predicted by our theoretical model and are accurately
estimated. Column (2) adds PMR as an additional control. PMR reflects different types
of entry regulations that limit competition on goods markets. Hence, PMR should be
39Capital intensities are proxied by the stock of capital computed as described above relative to the
total population instead of employment in order to mitigate the potential endogeneity of k∗/k. The
variable u∗ × k∗/k is instrumented by the interactions of k∗t−1/kt−1 with exogenous foreign variables
LMR∗i,t−1 and pmr
∗
i,t−1. See Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) for a related empirical strategy.
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Table 2: The role of foreign labor market distortions
Dep.var.: level of unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
b 0.081a 0.075a 0.103a 0.086a 0.081a 0.083a 0.072a 0.077a
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
b∗ 0.009a 0.012a 0.004 0.009b 0.027 0.057 0.013a 0.013a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.037) (0.003) (0.004)
b∗ × k∗/k 0.016a 0.011a
(0.004) (0.003)
k∗/k -1.216a -1.219a
(0.274) (0.263)
PMR 0.706a 0.856a 0.894a 0.847a 0.743a 0.899a
(0.193) (0.207) (0.219) (0.217) (0.188) (0.209)
Union density 0.008 -0.005 -0.013 -0.009
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
Union density∗ 0.062
(0.038)
High corporatism -1.545a -1.617a -1.603a -1.655a -1.558a
(0.415) (0.420) (0.445) (0.393) (0.407)
High corporatism∗ 2.270 1.371
(2.001) (1.916)
EPL 0.234 -0.418 -0.574 -0.448 -0.500
(0.343) (0.371) (0.380) (0.383) (0.382)
EPL∗ -2.465a -1.904b
(0.828) (0.837)
gap -0.613a -0.608a -0.622a -0.622a -0.627a -0.619a -0.635a -0.642a
(0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042)
gap∗ -0.021 -0.014 -0.034 -0.024 -0.042 -0.107 0.032 0.005
(0.070) (0.073) (0.070) (0.072) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.072)
RMSE 1.191 1.169 1.158 1.130 1.123 1.123 1.134 1.098
adj. R2 0.923 0.926 0.927 0.931 0.932 0.932 0.930 0.935
F 139.5 154.2 136.8 146.8 147.8 151.1 133.3 129.0
Robust standard errors in parentheses,ap < 0.01,b p < 0.05,c p < 0.1. Number of observations:
397 in all models. All regressions contain a full set of country fixed-effects, year dummies, and an
array of orthogonal shocks (TFP, terms of trade, real interest rate, and labor demand shocks) as
additional controls for business cycle comovements. Trade-weighted averages for foreign variables
(denoted by asterisks) are computed using α1 = α2 = 1, and δ = 1.
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a good proxy for overall openness to trade, as well. Not surprisingly, it correlates well
with conventional openness measures. It should, however, be less prone to endogeneity
concerns.
The estimates presented in column (2) imply that a one standard-deviation increase of
bit and of b
∗
it leads to an increase in the domestic unemployment rate by 0.318 and 0.065
standard deviations, respectively.40 Hence, on average, the domestic tax wedge is about 5
times as important quantitatively than the foreign one. This seems like a sensible result
which may, however, hide potentially large differences across countries.
Column (3) adds additional labor market institutions but drops PMR. This has an
important effect on the coefficients of both b and b∗, where the former grows substantially
larger and the latter looses statistical significance. However, as shown in column (4), the
inclusion of PMR restores the picture that we have already found in column (2). One
reason for the importance of PMR may lie in the fact that the construction of the weights
ωijt relies on exogenous geographical and demographic data only; it does not reflect trade
regulations that may curb the amount of trade between nations. Including PMR mitigates
this problem.
Columns (5) and (6) add foreign labor market institutions to the regression. Not
surprisingly, adding variables for which the direct effect on home unemployment is already
dubious (union density or EPL), does not improve accuracy of estimation. The coefficients
on b∗ are insignificant and seem unplausibly large; not to speak of the coefficient on EPL∗,
to name only the most striking case. Hence, the lack of a robust relationship between
these variables in standard equations such as (29) also impairs inference when using their
spatial lags.
Finally, columns (7) and (8) replicate our preferred specifications (2) and (4) with
the exception that they now also include the Heckscher-Ohlin relative capital-abundance
k∗/k and its interaction with the foreign wedge b∗. Theoretical considerations suggest that
a higher foreign wedge should lower the domestic rate of unemployment if the foreign
economy is on average more capital-rich than the domestic. Our results suggest that the
opposite holds: the more capital-rich the foreign country is, the stronger is the adverse
effect of foreign distortions on domestic unemployment. As in Table 1, we do not find
evidence in favor of the Heckscher-Ohlin view. Instead we find a strong negative direct
effect of k∗/k on domestic unemployment as in Table 1.
4.5 The role of real wage rigidity, country size and entry regu-
lation
Table 3 sheds additional light on the channels through which foreign institutions affect
domestic unemployment. First, we ask whether foreign labor market institutions have a
larger effect on domestic unemployment when domestic labor market institutions imply
a high degree of real wage rigidity. There is no clear consensus how to measure real wage
rigidity in a single indicator. Rather, the degree of real wage flexibility is a complicated
400.075× 18.21/4.29 = 0.318 and 0.012× 23.39/4.29 = 0.065.
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function of institutional variables. As a consequence, there is no recognized general mea-
sure of flexibility with sufficient time and country coverage available. In a very recent
paper, Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) provide a very simple measure of downward real
wage rigidity for 19 OECD countries from 1973-1999. Unfortunately the country cover-
age differs from our sample and the data is not balanced. However, in their analysis, they
conclude that “real wage cuts are less prevalent in countries with strict employment pro-
tection legislation and high union density” (p. 605). In the light of this finding, we use an
index of union density (adjusted for the degree of corporatism) as a proxy for the rigidity
of real wages.41 Our theoretical model suggests that foreign labor market institutions
should affect domestic unemployment more when domestic real wages are rigid. Hence,
we interact the rigidity proxy rigidi with the foreign wage wedge b
∗ and expect a positive
sign. Column (1) in Table 3 includes this interaction term into an unemployment regres-
sion of the type (32). The rigidity index itself has a positive but statistically insignificant
coefficient. Thus, the effect of wage rigidity on unemployment is not significant. However,
the interaction with the foreign wage wedge comes with positive sign and high statisti-
cal significance, indicating that the spill-over effect of labor market institutions is higher
when wages are more rigid. Adding additional labor market institutions to the regression
(column (2)) does not change the picture.
Second, we discuss the interaction between country size and the wage distortion. We
measure country size by population, just as in our theoretical analysis. This variable has
the advantage that it is exogenous. The logic is that the larger the domestic economy is,
the more strongly should it be negatively affected by bad domestic labor market institu-
tions and the less by foreign ones. Conversely, the larger the foreign economy is (weighted
by bilateral trade potentials), the more strongly should foreign distortions increase the
domestic unemployment rate while domestic distortions should be less important. Hence,
we expect that the coefficients on ln (pop)×b, ln (pop)×b∗, ln (pop∗)×b, and ln (pop∗)×b∗
should be positive, negative, negative and positive, respectively. Column (3) in Table 3 is
nicely in line with this sign pattern. However, statistical precision is not very high, most
likely due to the large degree of correlation between those interaction terms. Including the
degree of product market regulation into the regression (column (4)) does not alter the
sign of significant coefficients or their magnitudes and only partially improves statistical
accuracy. Column (5) focuses on statistically significant effects only. In line with our
theory, distortions are more harmful when they have their origins in large countries. In-
terestingly, the direct effect of the own and the foreign wage distortions is now negative.
There is also fairly strong evidence that – everything else equal – large countries have
smaller unemployment rates. This is also in line with the theoretical model, where larger
home markets are associated with fiercer competition, more varieties, and hence higher
productivity of the average firm and, consequently, with lower unemployment.
Third, we discuss the interaction between entry regulation42 and the wage wedge.
41The proxy is rigidi = union densityi × low corporatismi.
42 The measure of domestic entry regulation (pmr) provided by the OECD strongly correlates with
other openness measures (e.g., the share of trade over GDP), but has the advantage that it is unrelated
to geography and size.
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Table 3: Unemployment spillovers: the role of real wage flexibility, country size, and
openness
z = rigid z = ln(pop) z = pmr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
b 0.118a 0.124a -0.096 -0.160 -0.240c 0.054c 0.038 0.098a
(0.018) (0.018) (0.153) (0.153) (0.143) (0.030) (0.027) (0.020)
b∗ -0.007c 0.002 -0.324 -0.319 -0.382c 0.020 0.035c -0.006
(0.004) (0.010) (0.213) (0.205) (0.202) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016)
Interaction terms
z × b 0.029c 0.031b 0.035b 0.007 0.011a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004)
z × b∗ 0.127a 0.104a -0.003 0.001 -0.013a -0.008c
(0.033) (0.036) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
z∗ × b -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
z∗ × b∗ 0.036c 0.032 0.038c 0.017b 0.013b
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.007) (0.006)
Other controls
Rigidity index 1.164 2.624
(1.186) (3.296)
PMR 0.878a 0.889a 0.676c 0.370 0.804a
(0.228) (0.222) (0.375) (0.359) (0.226)
PMR∗ -0.039 0.165 -0.359 0.392 -0.519
(0.250) (0.228) (0.427) (0.277) (0.413)
ln(pop) -15.514a -16.357a -17.798a -19.642a -17.411a -19.102a -18.352a
(4.791) (5.075) (5.206) (4.939) (4.664) (4.546) (4.691)
ln(pop∗) -0.171 0.110 0.048 -0.239 -0.077 -0.315c 0.031
(0.149) (0.278) (0.269) (0.146) (0.182) (0.164) (0.179)
Union density -0.024 0.005 -0.011 -0.017 0.016 0.014 -0.008
(0.032) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024)
High corporatism -0.102 -1.788a -1.986a -2.002a -2.245a -2.529a -2.080a
(1.500) (0.616) (0.656) (0.638) (0.550) (0.529) (0.523)
EPL 0.606 0.569 -0.037 -0.031 -0.061 -0.245 0.035
(0.368) (0.395) (0.418) (0.407) (0.439) (0.408) (0.400)
gap -0.589a -0.611a -0.630a -0.630a -0.633a -0.629a -0.621a -0.631a
(0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)
gap∗ -0.002 -0.013 -0.019 -0.020 0.012 0.012 -0.038 0.010
(0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.072) (0.070) (0.079) (0.073) (0.074)
RMSE 1.129 1.115 1.120 1.091 1.091 1.136 1.104 1.104
adj R2 0.931 0.933 0.932 0.935 0.935 0.930 0.934 0.934
F 159.4 170.7 149.4 155.7 160.4 133.4 131.6 136.0
Robust standard errors in parentheses,ap < 0.01,b p < 0.05,c p < 0.1. Number of observations: 397 in all
regressions. All estimations use OLS and contain a full set of country fixed-effects and year dummies, and an
array of orthogonal shocks (TFP, terms of trade, real interest rate, and labor demand shocks) as additional
controls for business cycle comovements. Trade-weighted averages for foreign variables (denoted by asterisks)
are computed using α1 = α2 = 1, δ = 1.
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The analysis is motivated by the following considerations. If domestic entry regulation
is strong, interactions with foreign countries should be weak. In other words, we would
expect that the interaction pmr × b has a positive sign and the interaction pmr × b∗ a
negative one. If foreign regulation pmr∗ is high, domestic firms can rely very little on
foreign demand. Hence, whenever b goes up, they have to bear most of the induced reduc-
tion in demand themselves; we therefore expect that the effect of the interaction pmr∗× b
on domestic unemployment is positive. However, domestic unemployment would depend
less on foreign distortions since the foreign economy plays a smaller role for domestic
firms. Therefore, the coefficient on pmr∗ × b∗ should be negative. Column (6) in Table
3 tests these predictions in a model with all four potential interaction terms. Interaction
terms with domestic regulation come out with the right sign while those for foreign regu-
lation do not. Column (7) focuses on domestic regulation and the respective interaction
terms. They are statistically significant and show up with the right signs: the more closed
the domestic economy is, the more important are domestic institutions and the less the
foreign ones. This is in line with our theory. Column (8) concentrates on foreign regula-
tion. Interestingly, the more closed the foreign economy is the stronger are the domestic
unemployment-creating effects of foreign labor market distortions.
4.6 Robustness checks
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix contain a number of robustness checks on our preferred
specifications. Columns (1) to (6) in Table A3 refer to regressions that include the foreign
unemployment rate on the right-hand-side; columns (7) and (8) use foreign exogenous
variables. The regressions in columns (1) and (2) use the log of unemployment ln u as
the dependent variable instead of the level in a regression of domestic unemployment on
foreign one, but are otherwise perfectly similar to the regressions (4) and (5) presented in
Table 1. Compared to the benchmark case where the level of u is used, this transformation
ensures that the dependent variable takes values on the entire real line. There is no clear
consensus in the empirical cross-country unemployment literature as to whether ln u or u
is to be preferred. In the case of our regressions, the log specification has the drawback
that our IV strategy does not work well here; see the overidentification test associated to
the regression in column (2). However, qualitatively, our main result holds up in the OLS
and the IV model.
Column (3) in Table A3 reverts to the level of the unemployment rate as the dependent
variable and uses contemporaneous instruments rather than the lagged ones. This does
not change the qualitative findings relative to the benchmark of Table 1. Column (4)
presents an OLS model, using u∗i,t−1 as the dependent variable. Results change very little.
Columns (5) and (6) add an EU dummy to the regressions, but otherwise leaves the
regressions identical to those in Table 1. Inclusion of the dummy does not change the
results of the OLS and the IV model. Comfortingly, the EU dummy is only marginally
significant in the OLS model and insignificant in the IV specification, so that the accession
to the EU does not have any effects on the unemployment rate other than those already
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captured by the institutional variables in the model.43
Finally, columns (7) and (8) carry out two robustness checks relative to Table 2.
First, instead of using the level of the unemployment rate, its logarithm is used. This has
no effect on the signs of the right-hand-side variables nor on their statistical significance.
Second, the EU dummy is introduced into column (8), with the level of the unemployment
rate again as the dependent variable. Again, results do not change qualitatively. Here,
however, we do have some evidence that joining the EU does drive up the equilibrium
rate of unemployment.
Table A4 carries out extensive robustness checks with respect to the choice of nor-
malization of the weights. Columns (1) to (6) vary the elasticities of country size α1
and α2, as well as that of distance in the bilateral trade flow proxies shown in equation
(30). Odd-numbered columns refer to equation (5) in Table 1, even-numbered columns to
equation (5) in Table 2. First, the coefficient of the distance variable in the computation
of the weights is set to the lower bound of estimates found in the gravity literature, i.e.,
δ = 0.75 (Disdier and Head, 2008). Then a higher bound, i.e., δ = 1.50, is used. Quali-
tatively, these modifications have little effect on the estimates. To achieve a quantitative
comparison, we need to take into account that the sample moments of u∗ depend on the
weights. The standardized β coefficient of u∗ in column (1) is 0.096× 2.47/4.29 = 0.055
and in column (3) 0.065× 4.63/4.29 = 0.070. which nicely bounds the benchmark results
obtained in Table 1 (column (5), 0.06) from above and from below. Using a finer grid on
δ shows that the obtained standardized beta coefficients systematically fall in δ. In the
limit, when δ is infinite, the effect of u∗ vanishes. A similar effect is observed in columns
(2) and (4), where the variable of interest is b∗ instead of u∗.
Columns (5) and (6) modify the weights in that they close down the direct size effect:
α1 = α2 = 0. In both models, the signs of the interesting coefficients remain unchanged.
In terms of their economic significance, the standardized beta coefficients are 0.006 ×
36.07/4.29 = 0.050 in the case of column (5) and 0.052× 8.07/4.29 = 0.098 in the case of
column (6). Hence, taking out country size from the construction of the bilateral weights
reduces the estimated effects, but only in a very limited amount.
The remainder of Table A4 modifies the normalization of bilateral weights. In columns
(7) and (8) the weights are normalized by maxi (ωijt) , for each year t and country j, while
in columns (9) and (10) the weights are normalized such that they add up to one for the
20 OECD countries that our panel regressions draw upon. These different normalizations
do not have any bearing on the qualitative results. The standardized beta coefficient of
u∗ in column (9) is 0.006×32.33/4.29 = 0.045, which is in line with our previous findings.
43Note that the effect of EU membership is identified using time-variation only since the model features
country fixed-effects.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced search and matching unemployment into a multi-country
single-sector trade model with firm-level increasing returns to scale and product differ-
entiation. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their (constant) productivities, and
trade liberalization affects economies through selection effects as in Melitz (2003).
Allowing for asymmetric country sizes, labor market institutions, and trade costs, we
ask how an institutional change in one country affects labor market outcomes in other
countries. Countries are linked via trade on the product markets and maintain multilateral
trade balance. We find that an increase of the tax wedge (unemployment benefits plus
tax rate on wages) unambiguously increases unemployment in the country that enacts
the institutional change. In the trading partner countries, unemployment goes up as well.
Other labor market variables such as the efficiency of the search process or search costs
have similar effects. Hence, an exogenous shock on labor market institutions triggers a
positive correlation between countries’ unemployment rates.
We emphasize three key mechanisms that drive these results, namely, a market size
effect, a competitiveness effect, and a selection effect. A deterioration of labor market
institutions, such that domestic unemployment goes up, reduces the domestic market size.
The world market shrinks, and this implies lower exports for all countries. This anti-size
effect drives down labor demand and leads to higher unemployment in all countries in
the world that are at least partially open to international trade. This pure size effect
reverses the Krugman-type gains from trade that rely on the existence of larger markets.
However, even in absence of external economies of scale a smaller global market leads
to higher unemployment. The reason is that market size and selection effects interact:
with smaller global markets and less foreign competition, it is easier for inefficient firms
to maintain their market presence at home, which makes the average firm less productive.
This also drives up aggregate unemployment.
Bad domestic labor market institutions also affect foreign countries via the competi-
tiveness channel. For example, if improved outside options of workers drive up the real
wage so that exporters become less competitive internationally, the unemployment rate at
home goes up. On the other hand, trading partners become relatively more competitive,
which tends to decrease unemployment. However, the gain in competitiveness also has its
backside: as import competition is less fierce, inefficient firms find it easier to survive, the
average firm is less productive, and hence, the rate of unemployment in foreign countries
tends to increase.
We also find that the adverse effects of bad institutions depend on the degree of
geographical centrality of the “bad” country: the more central it is, the more strongly
other countries are exposed to the “bad” country, and the more severe are the adverse
spill-overs on their own labor market outcomes. By the same token, the larger the “bad”
country is, the more strongly other countries are affected: again, the reason is their
relatively larger exposure to that country.
Our calibrated model suggests that international spill-overs across countries are small
when wage are flexible. However, when real wages are rigid the effects are by at least one
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order of magnitude bigger. These two extreme scenarios open the interval in which the
‘true’ size of spill-overs is likely to lie.
In order to measure the empirical importance of spill-overs, we include trade-weighted
foreign variables into otherwise standard cross-country unemployment regressions run
on panel data for 20 rich OECD countries. The empirical evidence is in line with our
theoretical findings. Instrumenting the average foreign unemployment rate by foreign
exogenous variables and their time lags, and controlling for business cycle effects and own
labor market variables, we find a strong positive correlation between unemployment rates
of countries. Regressing the domestic unemployment rate directly on foreign institutions
confirms this finding. Moreover, we document that the importance of the foreign variables
for domestic outcomes is larger, the less domestic product markets are protected and the
more open the domestic economy is. We do not find any support for the prediction of
multi-sector Heckscher-Ohlin-type models, namely, that the correlation between domestic
labor market outcomes and foreign labor market regulation depends on the capital-labor
ratio. Hence, our empirical results confirm the qualitative predictions of our theoretical
model. On average, our results suggest that the effect of foreign institutions on domestic
unemployment is about 10% as strong as the effect of domestic institutions. We show
that, in order to replicate this finding, the Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching
model requires a stronger degree of real wage rigidity than the one provided by the usual
individual bargaining approach.
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Appendix
A1 Relationship between ϕ∗ii and ϕ
∗
ij
Using the demand equations (3) and the fact that pij[ϕ] = τ ijpii[ϕ], we can express relative
revenues at home and in the foreign country j from a firm with productivity ϕ based in
country i as:
Rij[ϕ]
Rii[ϕ]
= τ 1−σij
(
Pj
Pi
)σ−1 (Yj
Yi
)(
M¯i
M¯j
)1−ν
. (A1)
The zero-productivity cut-off above which firms produce for the domestic market, ϕ∗ii,
and the exporting productivity cut-off, above which firms produce for both the domestic
and the export market j, ϕ∗ij, are determined by Rii[ϕ
∗
ii] = σfiiPi and Rij[ϕ
∗
ij] = σfijPi,
respectively.
Combining these two equations leads to an equation that links the revenues of a firm
at the zero-profit productivity cut-off to those of a firm at the exporting productivity cut-
off. Further, the relationship between revenues of two firms with different productivities
in the same industry and country is given by: Rii[ϕ
′′
ii] =
(
ϕ′′ii
ϕ′ii
)σ−1
Rii[ϕ
′
ii]. These two
relationships together yield and equilibrium relationship between the two productivity
cut-offs:
ϕ∗ij = Λijϕ
∗
ii with (A2)
Λij = τ ij
Pi
Pj
(
Yifij
Yjfii
) 1
σ−1
(
M¯j
M¯i
) 1−ν
σ−1
. (A3)
The profits from serving the foreign market have to be large enough to justify the extra
fixed costs fij, where Λij would collapse to τ ij (fij/fii)
1/(σ−1) in the case of complete
symmetry. For ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
ii, we need Λij > 1. In the symmetric case, this requirement boils
down to fijτ
σ−1 > fii.
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Table A2: Summary statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
u unemployment rate (percent) 7.994 4.294 0.396 24.042
b tax wedge (percent) 58.385 18.212 21.008 96.973
PMR product market 3.864 1.290 1.050 6.000
regulation (index, 1-10) 3.864 1.290 1.050 6.000
Union density (percent)
High corporatism (dummy) 0.554 0.498 0.000 1.000
EPL employment protection 2.080 1.082 0.200 4.188
legislation (index, 1-10)
gap output gap (percent) -1.019 2.538 -12.211 6.297
u∗ W x u 2.399 3.144 0.037 13.875
b∗ W x b 18.182 23.394 0.269 89.783
PMR∗ W x PMR 1.230 1.679 0.011 8.181
Union density∗ W x union density 12.426 15.974 0.180 71.088
High corporatism∗ W x high corporatism 0.176 0.245 0.001 1.096
EPL∗ W x EPL 0.657 0.882 0.009 4.252
gap∗ W x gap -0.303 0.990 -5.803 2.699
k∗/k (W x (K/L)) / (K/L) 0.942 1.798 0.000 9.474
TFP shock -0.002 0.023 -0.099 0.054
TOT shock -0.037 0.066 -0.217 0.187
Real interest rate shock 4.759 2.194 -9.282 14.122
Demand shock 0.033 0.062 -0.138 0.236
All data (except weighting matrix W) are from Bassanini and Duval (2006). Number of observations
N = 397. Weights are based on α1 = α2 = 1 and δ = 1; standard normalization. Foreign variables are
not to be interpreted as means, since weights do not add up to 1 (due to inclusion of rest of the world in
calculation of weights).
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Figure A1: Country 1 labor market regulation, trade costs, and real wages [on vertical
axis] in countries 1 and 2 (=3).
A2 Wage effects
As we have demonstrated in the main text, the magnitude of the spill-over crucially
depends on the level of real wage flexibility. Hence, in parallel to the unemployment
effects described in the main text for the individual-bargaining model, we illustrate in this
Appendix the accompanying results for real wages. Due to the way how unemployment
and wages are determined in the individual-bargaining regime, real wage effects are mainly
mirror images of the unemployment effects: Whenever a policy change in one country
leads to a decrease in average productivity in its trading partners, we will not only see an
increase in unemployment in the trading partners but also a decrease in real wages.
A2.1 How domestic institutions impact outcomes world-wide
Result A1a [Globalization and labor markets]
Trade liberalization leads to higher real wages in all countries.
Result A1b [Labor market reform]
If one country increases its unemployment benefits, then real wages increase in that coun-
try.
Result A1c [Institutional spill-overs]
If one country increases its unemployment benefits, then, in all other countries, real wages
will fall.
For an illustration see Figure A1. Again Result A1a is a generalization of the results
found by Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2008) for asymmetric countries. Result A1b
stems from the fact that higher unemployment benefits increase the bargaining power of
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Figure A2: Change in real wages [on the vertical axis] as a function of centrality and size
of the “bad” country 1 for a given change of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8.
workers. A novelty is Result A1c, which is the backside of Result 1c in the main text,
stating that an increase in unemployment benefits in one country will lead to an increase in
unemployment in all other countries. This is due to the institutional spill-overs described
in detail in the main text.
A2.2 The role of geography and relative size
Result A2a [Geography and spill-overs]
As the degree of centrality of country 1 goes up, a given rise in country 1’s unemployment
benefits yields a larger real wage increase in country 1 and a larger decrease in countries
2 and 3.
Result A2b [Relative size and spill-overs]
The higher the relative size of country 1 the weaker is the increase in real wages in coun-
try 1 and the larger is the decrease in all other countries due to a rise of country 1’s
unemployment benefits.
The conditioning effects of centrality and size of country 1 are visualized in Figure A2.
Concerning trade costs, we find that the change in real wages increases in all countries.
Hence, in country 1 the increase in real wages is larger if it is more central, whereas the
decrease in real wages increases in the rest of the world. This finding roots in the fact
that with higher centrality of country 1, country 1 more easily can spill-over bad labor
market institutions.
Concerning the country size we find that an increasing size of country 1 leads to a
lower increase in real wages in country 1 but a stronger decrease in real wages in all other
countries. The explanation is similar to the one given for the effects on unemployment: If
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Figure A3: Change in real wages [on the vertical axis] as a function of trade costs and
the elasticity of substitution for a given change of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8.
country 1 is larger, home demand is more important, making it harder to spill-over bad
labor market institutions to foreign countries. However, for the foreign countries a larger
country 1 means a more important trading partner, leading to a higher sensitivity on the
economic performance of this country.
A2.3 The role of the elasticity of substitution and external economies
of scale
Result A3 [The elasticity of substitution and spill-overs]
The higher the elasticity of substitution, the smaller are the changes in real wages in all
countries following a rise of country 1’s unemployment benefits.
As discussed in the main text, an increase in the elasticity of substitution leads to a
weakening of the income effect and to a strengthening of the competitiveness effect and
thus lowers the spill-over effects of bad labor market institutions. As illustrated in Figure
A3 this implies that the wage drops in countries 2 and 3 become smaller.
Result A4 [External economies of scale and spill-overs]
Stronger external economies of scale result in smaller decreases in real wages for all trading
partner countries. The results for country 1 are ambiguous.
The result is illustrated in Figure A4. For real wages, two things are important: the
nominal wage, and the price level for the aggregated final output good. Both, the nominal
wage and the price level for the aggregated final output good change the sign when ν varies.
For low ν’s the change is positive for both, whereas the change is negative for high ν’s.44
44Note that P1 = 1 due to our normalization. Hence, a decrease of P2 implies a higher relative price
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Figure A4: Change in real wages [on the vertical axis] as a function of trade costs and
external economies of scale for a given change of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8.
If ν is low, the competitiveness and relative composition of home and foreign varieties
drives the results. However, for high ν’s the absolute market size is important. We know
from Figure A2 that the real wage change should increase in country 1 and decrease in
country 2, if country 1 becomes smaller and external economies of scale are not present,
i.e., ν = 0. However, if external economies of scale are important, the real wage change in
country 1 will be lower and may even turn negative, as the smaller home market implies
fewer home varieties, leading in equilibrium to lower relative real wages due to a relative
increase in the costs of living. The change in real wages in country 2 becomes smaller,
as external economies of scale become more important because country 2 now has more
varieties compared to country 1, leading to a relative decrease of the aggregate price level.
A2.4 How important is firm-level heterogeneity?
Result A5 [How firm heterogeneity conditions spill-overs]
The larger the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution describing the distribution of
firm-level productivity, the higher is the increase in real wages of country 1 and the lower
are the decreases in real wages of the trading partner countries, triggered by a given in-
crease in unemployment benefits in country 1.
Result A5 is plotted in Figure A5. Similar as for unemployment, the real wage change
decreases with increasing similarity of firms. The reason is again that the competitiveness
channel is weakened, and that spill-overs are weak if firms are more homogenous as only
few firms export.
for the aggregate good in country 1.
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Figure A5: Change in real wages [on the vertical axis] as a function of trade costs and
the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution for a given change of b1 from 0.4 to 0.8.
Result A6a [Spill-overs in the Krugman economy]
If firms are homogenous and external economies of scale are important (ν = 1), then an
increase of unemployment benefits in country 1 leads to a decrease of real wages in all
countries.
The increase in unemployment is accompanied by a loss in real wages in all countries,
as is shown in Figure A6. The main reason here is that due to less varieties and higher
prices, the overall price level rises. This is a result of the external economies of scale. As
in the Krugman model with perfect labor markets, larger markets imply lower prices and
higher real wages. Hence, if unemployment goes up, the opposite effects occur.
Result A6b [Spill-overs in the Krugman economy without external economies
of scale]
If firms are homogenous and there are no external economies of scale (ν = 0), an increase
in unemployment benefits in one country will have ambiguous wage effects in that country
while in all other countries wages increase.
Figure A7 plots real wages when firms are homogenous and external economies of scale
are not important. In this case, the effects on real wages for country 1 are ambiguous.
On the one hand, home varieties become relatively more expansive as foreign varieties,
implying higher costs of living, and hence, lower real wages. On the other hand, higher
unemployment benefits lead to higher equilibrium bargained nominal wages. The net
effect is ambiguous. For the trading partner, the compositional effect implies a gain
in attractiveness, leading to relative lower prices for home varieties relative to foreign
varieties. This leads to a fall of the costs of living and therefore to higher real wages.
Note that this compositional effect again vanishes as for unemployment if all varieties
enter the price index symmetrically, which is the case when trade costs are zero. Hence,
real wages do not change at all if τ = 1.
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Figure A6: Country 1 labor market regulation and real wages in countries 1 and 2 (=3),
when ν = 1 and firms are homogeneous. This corresponds to a Krugman (1980) economy.
[Real wages on the vertical axis.]
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Figure A7: Country 1 labor market regulation and real wages in countries 1 and 2 (=3),
when ν = 0 and firms are homogeneous. [Real wages on the vertical axis.]
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